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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 25, 2004 the Government of Guyana invoked arbitration under
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea against its neighboring
coastal state, Suriname, to settle the disputed maritime boundary.' The
Republic of Guyana,2 a small nation on the Caribbean coast of South America,
is today confronted with other major territorial disputes with its neighbors. To
its west, Venezuela3 claims the sparsely populated and heavily forested
Essequibo region. To its east, Suriname4 claims a maritime border, a boundary
river, and a huge tract of forested land in the southeast called the "New River
Triangle." If these disputes are settled against Guyana, the nation would be
deprived of more than fifty percent of its currently occupied territory, a large
amount of its territorial sea, outlying maritime areas, and significant natural
resources. A major foreign policy objective of Guyana since its independence
from Great Britain has been to reach comprehensive demarcations of its
frontiers and ensure its territorial integrity.
These disputes began long before Venezuela, Guyana, and Suriname
emerged from colonialism. After various European nations established
colonies in South America, these developing nations became embroiled in their
own wars and territorial claims. Although achieving independence, the states
which emerged from colonialism have inherited territorial disputes and are
often ill-equipped to handle the complexity such disputes entail. As conditions
changed, resources are discovered, and populations shift, these problems can
no longer be ignored.
' Thomas W. Donovan, Guyana Invokes Annex VII of United Nations Convention on Law
of the Sea Against Suriname for Disputed Maritime Boundary, ASIL INSIGHTS, Apr. 2003, at
www.asil.org/insights.
2 The formal name of Guyana is "The Republic of Guyana." This Article will refer to
"British Guiana" to describe the area that is now the Republic of Guyana until its independence
in 1966. Likewise, this Article will use the term "Guyana" to refer to the Republic of Guyana
after independence. See ATLAS A-Z 229 (Dorling Kindersley Publishing 2001).
' The formal name of Venezuela is the "Republic of Venezuela." This Article will refer to
"Gran Colombia" to describe the area that is now the Republic of Venezuela and Colombia after
their independence from Spain in 1811, but before Venezuela separated from this state in 1834.
It will use the term "Venezuela" to describe the modem Republic of Venezuela since its
independence. See GARYMACEOIN, COLOMBIAANDVENEZUELAANDTHEGUIANAS 45 (1965).
4 The formal name for Suriname is, "Republiek van Suriname." This Article will refer to
"Dutch Guiana" to describe the area that is now the Republiek van Suriname until its
independence from The Netherlands in 1975. Likewise, this Article will refer to Suriname to
describe the country that occupied the area that Dutch Guiana administered after 1975. See 18
THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 807 (1985).
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In the modem world, states seek secure and stable borders and are loathe
to yield land or even compromise on issues that question their territorial
integrity. Short of war, the disputing nations are thus compelled to seek
resolution through arbitrators, usually in the form of respected and neutral
international tribunals. Such tribunals evaluate the colonial histories, claims
over time, and historical precedents to support such claims. Guyana and its
disputing neighbors, however, have yet to reach this point. The countries
involved have found it difficult to offer compromises or show willingness to
allow international bodies to mediate. Political leaders who make such
proposals risk losing their popularity. To avoid this, politicians are more often
inclined to demand concessions from the opposing state, make threats, and
assert their nation's rights. Meanwhile, the disputed territories are gradually
being developed and occupied by different citizens and business organizations
that are becoming entrenched without the establishment of firm legal
precedents.
The first step toward resolution will be the establishment of an orderly
framework by which the disputes can be negotiated and settled legally. This
Article provides such a framework. It will discuss the historical developments
of the boundary conflicts, territorial claims all three nations have asserted over
time, and the applicable legal principles that must support these claims. It
reveals how Guyana will have more to gain in internationally sponsored
arbitration than its neighbors. If all parties submit to communal jurisdiction
of an international tribunal, it is unlikely that Venezuela will prevail in its
claim for the Essequibo, and Suriname will likely be awarded the bordering
Courantyne River and a beneficial territorial sea, leaving Guyana with control
over the Essequibo, New River Triangle, and outlying maritime zones.
This Article demonstrates why most of Guyana's claims would likely be
sustained by international arbitrators, given existing legal precedents, historical
incorporation of treaties, and the realities of constructive occupation. Under
these considerations the Essequibo region between Venezuela and Guyana
would most probably be awarded to Guyana based upon historical incorpora-
tion of treaties through state law succession mechanisms and recognition
principles as seen under international law. The 1899 Paris Arbitration Award'
that originally deeded the Essequibo region to Guyana will be seen as binding
and inherited by the Republic of Guyana from Great Britain. A claim by
Venezuela that the award was procured by fraud and therefore invalid will be
difficult to support. Guyana's claims to the inland southeastern New River
'Odeen Ishmael, Guyana's Western Border, http://www.guyana.org/Western/Cover.htm.
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Triangle will likely be sustained because these claims are supported by
historical precedents from the previously conducted, yet un-ratified work of
boundary commissions. The disputed Courantyne River will be awarded to
Suriname based upon historic title being inherited by a former colonial state
under the concept of uti possedetis. Because the entire river would be awarded
to Suriname, it will affect the land boundary terminus, allowing Suriname
control over its claimed immediate territorial sea. However, because
international courts have consistently not awarded maritime boundary claims
to encompass maritime zones not recognized by the parties at the time of
agreement,6 Suriname may not assume control of these territories simply by
reiterating its claim for the territorial sea. Therefore, the location of long-
standing Guyanese concessions and prior claims to these outlying maritime
areas7 may award them to Guyana based upon traditional methods of maritime
delineation.
HI. THREE DISPUTED TERRITORIES
Three distinct territories are in dispute between Guyana and its neighbors.
Part II.A describes the Essequibo region of Western Guyana that is now in
dispute with Venezuela. Part I.B describes the New River Triangle, a sparsely
populated section in the southeast of Guyana that is in dispute with Suriname.
Part U. C describes the offshore maritime area and the Courantyne River which
forms a boundary between Suriname and Guyana.
6 Peggy A. Hoyle, The Guyana-Suriname Maritime Boundary Dispute and its Regional
Context, 9 BoUNDRY & SECURITY BuLa. No. 2, at 99, 207.
7Id.
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(c) Tlhe online World Book Jzncyclopedia
A. Essequibo
During the nineteenth century, Venezuela and British Guiana claimed
territories whose borders overlapped. This area is known today as the
Essequibo region (labeled "Venez. Claim" on map). The region consists of
roughly 50,000 square miles.' Other estimates place the area as large as
63,600 square miles.9 This region is roughly the size of New York State. The
area is between the very large Orinoco and Essequibo Rivers.'0 The Essequibo
ALAN J. DAY, BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 381 (1982).
Venezuela Eyes Endto Guyana BorderDispute, CNN (July 23,2001), athttp://www.rose-
hulman.edu/-delacova/venezuela/venezuela-border.htm.
10 JACQUELiNE ANNE BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, THE VENEZUELA-GUYANA BORDER DISPUTE:
BRITAIN'S COLONIAL LEGACY IN LATIN AMERICA 77 (1984).
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region lies to the west of the Essequibo River and extends to the Guyana-
Venezuela boundary dictated by the 1899 Paris Arbitration Award."
The Essequibo is sparsely populated, with an estimated 100,000 people,' 2
although the numbers have not accurately been verified. The Essequibo area
is heavily forested land" and extends southwards in the Rupununi savannahs
by the city of Lethem, and north to the Caribbean Sea. It includes the cities of
Charity and Mabaruma, and encompasses the Kanaku and Pakaraima mountain
ranges, where the highest peak extends over 9,000 feet.'4 In the northeastern
area of the disputed zone, at the mouth of the Orinoco River there are disputed
islands around the area of Parika."5
Most of the inhabitants of the Essequibo interior are small scale gold and
diamond miners and Amerindians who live in the Southern Rupununi
savannahs. 6 There are significant concentrations of gold, copper, iron ore,
nickel, and mica.' 7 Diamonds and manganese have been found but not in
quantities sufficient for commercial production." The Guyanese government,
with the assistance of the Home Oil Company, explored for oil in the interior
of the Essequibo. Wells were drilled in the interior Takutu basin in the
Rupununi area. 9 Oil has also been found in the disputed northern coastal and
offshore areas, and in 1971 a Dutch-German-American consortium initially
drilled two wells.' ° In 1979, the Guyanese government signed an agreement
with a U.S.-led consortium for a five-year joint concession.2"
Guyana has also granted a concession of 100,000 acres to a Texas based
firm, Beal Aerospace, to install a satellite launching base in the Essequibo
" The 1899 Award line is the present demarcation of the Guyana-Venezuela boundary. It
was awarded by an American-led tribunal in 1899 and is contested by Venezuela. This issue will
be discussed infra. See DAY, supra note 8, at 381.
'2 See BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10, at 38; see also DAY, supra note 8, at 381;
BRITANNICA ATLAS 246-47 (1989).
'3 Philip Szczesniak, United States Geological Service The Mineral Industry of Guyana
(2000), available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/mineralslpubs/country/2000/9513000.pdf (last
visited Jan. 28, 2004); see also MACEOIN, supra note 3, at 45.
14 See BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10, at 38.
'5 See GUYANA AND BELizE: COUNTRY STUDIES (AREA HANDBOOK SERIES) 125 (1993)
[hereinafter AREA HANDBOOK SERIES].
16 See BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10, at 80.
17 See id.; see also Szczesniak, supra note 13, at 1.
1 RAYMOND T. SMITH, BRITISH GUIANA 2 (1962).
19 See BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10, at 81.
20 Trinidad Guardian, May 13, 1971, at 1; see also BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10, at
81.
21 See BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10, at 81.
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2region. The Venezuelan government objected to the grant, stating, "we have
informed Guyana of our claim on the Essequibo territory, which was taken
from Venezuela by the colonialists. The country and President Hugo Chavez's
administration have not and will not relinquish that claim."23
B. New River Triangle
The area of the New River Triangle comprises over 6,000 square miles.24
It is located between the Courantyne River and the New River (labeled "Sur.
Claim" on map). An agreement between the predecessor colonial administra-
tions in 1799 provided that the delineation between the preceding colonial
entities of British Guiana and Dutch Guiana would be the west bank of the
Courantyne River.25 However, when this agreement was concluded, neither
colonial administration was exactly aware of the source of the Courantyne
River. Through its own expedition, Guyana claimed the Kutari River, a river
feeding the Courantyne from a southeast direction as the boundary. However,
based upon a later survey, Suriname claimed the New River, a river flowing
from a southwest direction as its version of the boundary. The area bounded
by these two rivers is called "The New River Triangle."26
I Satellite launching is more cost effective when conducted near the Equator. In French
Guiana (still a colony of France, and therefore French sovereign territory), the European Space
Agency operates its own launch facility. On July 14th, Guyana granted the concession to Beal
Aerospace (currently not operating). Notimex New Service (Mexico City), July 16, 2000; see
also JOE PAPPALARDO, Love and Rockets, DALLAS OBSERVER ONLINE, Mar. 1, 2001, at http://
bealaerospace.con/articles/DallasObserver/DallasobserverS.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
23 El Universal News Service (Caracas-Intemet Version), July 16, 2000.
24 GUYANA MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, GUYANA-SURINAME BOUNDARY, para 4. Other
sources indicate that the New River Triangle is as large as 8,000 square miles. See Government
of Suriname Homepage, at http://www.suriname.nu; Background to Our Border Row with
Suriname, GUYANA GRAPHIC, Jan. 17, 1968.
' Thomas W. Donovan, Suriname-Guyana Maritime and Territorial Disputes: A Legal and
Historic Analysis, 13 J. TRANSNAT'LL. & POL'Y 41, 45 (2003). The 1799 Agreement, will be
discussed infra, as it pertains to the relationships between separate colonies before the British
and the Dutch formalized their present colonies. Guyana-Suriname Boundary, GUYANA Bus.,
July-Aug. 1968.
26 Duke E. Pollard, The Guyana/Suriname Boundary Dispute in International Law,
CARIBBEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 219 (1976). The Maroon Indians are
today the only people living in the New River Triangle. Their numbers are no more than 5,000,
and of that number most are seasonal gold and diamond prospectors who move intermittently
throughout the unfortified border region. Id.
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Within the New River Triangle are significant timber and mineral
resources." Guyana awarded a Malaysian corporation a 500,000 hectare
logging concession in the New River Triangle.2" There is also evidence of
significant aluminum and bauxite deposits.29 Within the New River Triangle,
there is the possibility of commercially viable gold and diamond resources.3"
The large rivers that are fed from the same Northern Amazon watershed have
commercially viable hydroelectric capacity.3
C. Maritime Zone
The disputed maritime area between Guyana and Suriname (labeled
"Suriname Claim" and "Guyana Claim" on map) extends on the continental
shelf out nearly 150 miles, before dropping into the Southern Caribbean
trench. Commercial entities such as Exxon, AGIP, and Burlington have been
successfully drilling for petroleum in this area since the colonial era.32
In June 2000, the United States Geological Survey's World Petroleum
Assessment 2000 estimated the resource potential for the Guyana Basin at 15.2
billion barrels of oil.33 If the potential is reached, it would become the twelfth
most productive site in the world and the second most important unexplored
region in the world.34 However, various corporations have expressed doubt
27 See Szczesniak, supra note 13, at 3; B.O. Wills, New River Area Rich in Radio-Active
Materials, SUNDAY CHRON., Feb. 4, 1968.
" Press Release, World Forest Campaign, Timber Concession Freeze Feels the Heat: New
Timber Permits Imminent While Mining Moves South (Mar. 3, 1996), available at http://
forests.org/recent/1996guymelt.htm
29 Aluminum exports accounted for seventy-seven percent of Suriname's estimated $453.3
million export earnings in 1996. See Szczesniak, supra note 13, at 4.
30 See Pollard, supra note 26, at 219.
31 See Szczesniak, supra note 13, at 3; Govt. Reaffirms Support for Kabalebo, GUYANA
CHRON., Nov. 26, 1981, at 1; Guyana Has Firm Desire to Maintain Friendly Ties with
Suriname, GUYANA CHRON., Nov. 27, 1981.
32 See Leo Morpurgo, Consortium Zoekt Olie in Zee Suriname, NRC HANDELSBLAD, Aug.
24, 1999, available at http://www.nrc.n1/w2/Nieuws/1999/08/24UpIO7.html. Offshore
concessions in Suriname are valid for forty years. See Petroleum Law of 1990, reprinted in
HYDROCARBON LEGAL FACTs OF SuRINAME (Feb. 2002). Petrochemical companies and
petrochemical service companies that are involved in extraction on the Guyana Basin include
Statsoil (national company of Suriname), CGX, Maxis Petroleum, Korean National Oil
Company, Century, AGIP, TotalFina, Exxon-Mobil, and Burlington Resources. Id.
3 CGX Homepage, at www.cgxresources.com/2001-pagel.html (last visited Apr. 15,2004).
id. The United States Geological Study projected the Guyana Basin would have
approximately twenty-four "Elephants" (deposits containing 100 million barrels of oil) and six
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about the extent of resources. Shell Oil, for example, withdrew from its Abary
Well license in 1974, presumably basing its decision upon the lack of viable
petroleum.
35
m. HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF DISPUTES
A. Venezuela-Guyana
1. Early History of Dispute
In 1640, Dutch trade concerns established several settlements on the
northern coast of South America, which was referred to as "the Wild Coast"
or "the Guianas. "36 The Dutch maintained settlements at the Essequibo River,
and according to a treaty signed in 1648 between Holland and Spain, extended
sovereignty as far west to the Orinoco River. 37 Gradually, during the Dutch
colonization of the Guianas, the Moruca River (125 miles east of the Orinoco
River) was regarded as the boundary between their settlements in Guyana and
the Spanish occupied areas of Venezuela.38
The Guyana sub-province was officially created in 1762, and by Royal
Decree of The Netherlands in 1768, its boundaries were stated as "the Atlantic
on the east to the Upper Orinoco, Casequlare, and Rio Negro on the west and
the lower Orinoco on the north, and the Amazon River to the south., 39 By
"Giants" (deposits containing more than 500 million barrels). The Guyana basin is also
estimated to contain 42 metric ton TcF of natural gas. Id. However, certain oil consortiums have
not been convinced of the extent of resources. Shell Oil, for instance, ceased specific operations
in the disputed area before June 2000 asserting lack of resources, and relinquished its license.
Id.
31 See CGX Homepage, at www.cgxresources.com (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
36 The Guianas consist of Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana. All were
former colonial holdings of European powers, except French Guiana which still maintains its
colonial overseas status of France. The Dutch holdings were originally assets of the Dutch West
Indies Corporation, a quasi-national entity. See Colin Henfrey, Guyana, LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN 279 (Claudio Vdliz ed., 1968).
37 LESLIE B. RouT, WHICH WAY OUT? AN ANALYSIS OF THE VENEZUELAN-GUYANA
BOUNDARY DISPuTE 2-3 (1971). See also BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10, at 97; DAY,
supra note 8, at 351.
39 BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10, at 98.
" Francisco Xavier Yanes, Compendio de la Historia desde el Descubrimiento y Conquista
hasta que se Declaro Estado Independiente, 1940, in BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10, at 97.
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1704, the Dutch had an extensive trading network spreading down the
Essequibo to the Rupununi in the south and to the Orinoco in the west.'
In the Napoleonic wars of 1814, the Dutch lost control of many overseas
possessions and ceded the South American colonies to Great Britain, in an act
known as the Treaty of London.4 Although intermittent skirmishes continued
throughout the area, Great Britain maintained these settlements, collectively
named British Guiana, under the Overseas Colonial Office until independence
in 1966.42 The British saw their colony as the successor state to the original
Dutch colonies, and likewise inherited all the territory claimed and inhabited
by the Dutch. During the control over British Guiana, the British colonial
government issued claims, which exceeded the exercised controlled area of the
Essequibo, all the way to Moruca.43
Throughout this time, the Spanish Government ruled the territory of
modem day Venezuela and Colombia. The Spanish Government initially came
to the Caribbean Coast of South America before the British and Dutch formed
settlements, yet the Spanish concentrated their trade and development on the
Pacific side of the continent. With the development of trade routes between
Cartagena, Panama, and Havana, the Spanish Government took a great interest
in the Caribbean." In 1819, a new nation named Gran Colombia achieved
independence from Spain and immediately made a claim to the Essequibo
region directly to its east, labeling it the Guyana Essequiba.4' Gran Colom-
bia's ministers to England informed the British colonial government "that the
Essequibo River was their nation's frontier with British Guiana. 4 6 Britain
ignored these claims. 7
40 Id. at 97-98.
"' Great Britain took control of the specific colonies of Demarara, and Essequibo, and
Berbice. These colonies collectively form the rough boundaries of British Guiana. See Stephen
Clissold & Alistar Hennessy, Territorial Disputes, in Veliz, supra note 36, at 406; see also Otto
Schoenrich, The Venezuelan-British Guiana Boundary Dispute, 43 AM. J. INT'LL. 523, 523-24
(1949).
42 See DAY, supra note 8, at 380-8 1; see also AREA HANDBOOK SERIES, supra note 15, at
125.
' See Schoenrich, supra note 41, at 524.
4 Kwan Kim & Michael Donovan, Fujimori's Financiers: How Japan Became the Largest
Aid Donor in Latin America and Its Implications for Future Economic Development, Kellogg
Institute Working Papers Series, No. 291, Jan. 2002.
' See ROUT, supra note 37, at 7-8.
6 Id. at 7.
41 Id. at 7-8.
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In 1834, Venezuela formally separated itself from Gran Colombia.8 In the
Treaty of Recognition, following secession, there was no reference to the
eastern border of Venezuela.49 Because of this omission, the Royal British
Geographical Society in 1834 commissioned a surveyor and naturalist, Robert
Herman Schomburgk, to survey the boundaries.50 In 1839 Schomburgk
produced a map and a memoir in which he described his findings and ideas
regarding a convenient boundary between the new country of Venezuela and
the English colony. The memoir was forwarded to the Overseas Office, and
in 1840, the English commissioned Schomburgk to demarcate a westward
boundary of British Guiana without Gran Colombia's approval.5' This
culminated in 1841 in the production of boundary pillars and a map indicating
English control from the mouth of the Orinoco River to Point Barima.
Venezuela protested the location of the boundary pillars, and Great Britain
agreed to remove them. Venezuela insisted the markers were only a boundary
claim, not a manifestation of effective occupation of British subjects.5 2
When Venezuela ceded from Gran Columbia it concluded a recognition
treaty between the former colonial government and colony. 53 Because of the
stalemates that plagued early boundary negotiations, both the British and
Venezuelan governments made a "status quo" declaration, calling for "non-
violation of the disputed zone by either party."54 The agreement was short
lived; in the late 1850s, the discovery of substantial gold deposits proved too
economically compelling, and the dispute was reignited. British settlers
moved into the region and the British Guiana Mining Company was formed to
48 See MACEOIN, supra note 3, at 45.
' See ROUT, supra note 37, at 8.
50 See SCHOENRICH, supra note 41, at 524; see also ROUT, supra note 37, at 8. Schomburgk
was also commissioned to demarcate the Southern and Eastern borders of British Guiana
bordering Dutch Guiana and Brazil. His demarcations during this era are the bases for several
claim lines to be discussed infra. See DAY, supra note 8, at 380-81.
5' See ROUT, supra note 37, at 8.
52 See Schoenrich, supra note 41, at 524; see MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF
VENEZUELA, "The Report on the Boundary Question with British Guiana Submitted to the
National Government by the Venezuelan Experts" (1967). The report quotes a report by the
Minister of Gran Colombia, Jose Manual Hurtado saying: "The Republic of Colombia is today
composed of. .. a beautiful and rich country (which] extends by the Northern Sea, from the
Essequibo River or the limits of the province of Guyana, up to the Culebras River in the
boundary with Guatemala." See Public Record Office of London F.O. 18/10, reprinted in
BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10, at 289.
" See ROUT, supra note 37, at 10.
54 Id. at 11.
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mine the deposits.55 Later, British Guiana citizens began inhabiting this area,
during a time that Venezuela was unable to protest because of "civil strife" and
revolution.56
In 1877, an official map of British Guiana was published, dated 1875,
showing the Schomburgk Line as the boundary. The map included a note
asserting that this line "should not be taken as authoritative as it had not been
adjusted by the respective governments."57  When gold deposits were
discovered in the area, a new map was published in 1886 (still dated 1875) but
showing a Schomburgk Line that had been moved far to the west. The map did
not reference the fact that this area was in dispute or subject to adjustment by
either the Venezuelan or British governments. Based upon these actions,
Venezuela formally lodged a diplomatic protest and demanded the evacuation
of the territory claimed by Great Britain from a point east of the Moruca
River.5" Great Britain ignored the protest and suspended diplomatic relations
with Venezuela.
2. 1899 Paris Arbitration Tribunal
Throughout the nineteenth century, Venezuela had made repeated proposals
to arbitrate the Essequibo dispute.59 These efforts were ignored by Great
Britain. Venezuela finally broke diplomatic relations with Britain in 1887 and
appealed to the United States for help. Lord Salisbury refused Venezuela's
requests for arbitration, and brushed aside the offers of mediation by the
United States. The United States was at that time primarily concerned with the
development of the trans-continental canal, and the extension of the Monroe
Doctrine in Latin America.60 In 1894, William L. Scruggs, an attorney
originally appointed by Grover Cleveland, was hired by the Venezuelan
Government to negotiate on its behalf. Scruggs published a report entitled
British Aggression in Venezuela, or the Monroe Doctrine on Trial.6' His
" Library of Congress Country Studies, Guyana: Origins of the Border Dispute, available
athttp://www.workmaU.comwfb200l/guyana/guyanahistory-origins-of-the-border-dispute
_with-venezuela.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
56 See Schoenrich, supra note 41, at 524.
57 id.
" See ROUT, supra note 37, at 12.
59 id.
HENRY JAMES, RICHARD OLNEY AND His PuBuc SERviCE 124 (1923).
61 ALEXANDER DECONDE, A HSTORY OFAMERICANFOREIGNPOICY (1931) (asserting that
the 1894 Corinto Island Affair, where Great Britain succeeded in establishing support in
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theory was that the British policies in Latin America infringed upon United
States concerns in the Panama Canal. He believed their refusal to arbitrate
further indicated their commitment to continue aggression.
Responding to this scrutiny, President Cleveland delivered a message to a
joint session of Congress, "recommending the appointment of a commission
so that the United States might determine for its own purposes where the true
divisional line lay. ' 62 Mr. Scruggs then persuaded the United States Congress
to pass a resolution urging Britain and Venezuela to arbitrate the dispute.63
The resolution passed both Houses of the U.S. Congress by a unanimous vote,
and President Cleveland signed it into law on February 20, 1895.64 This
resolution resulted in the U.S. Congress nominating members of the boundary
commission.65 Throughout this time, Great Britain was the premier colonial
power in the world, including in the Western Hemisphere." The arbitration
between Venezuela and British Guiana served as a pre-textual way to assert
American dominance over the Caribbean and Latin America, and establish the
United States as an international power.67
Honduras, exacerbated the tension between Great Britain and the United States. Conde further
argues that it was this alleged weakness of the United States government in dealing with the
British that strongly influenced Cleveland's decision to make a stand in 1895.
6 See BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10, at 38 (noting that James argues that the decision
of the United States to become involved in the conflict was part of a general concept to become
involved throughout the Latin American area, and to strengthen the Monroe Doctrine); see also
ROUT, supra note 37, at 8; JAMES, supra note 60, at 100 (quoting President Cleveland as saying
"Ihe appeals of Venezuela for help.., were incessantly ringing in our ears").
3 See ROUT, supra note 37, at 17.
6 ODEEN ISHMAEL, THE TRAILOF DIPLOMACY, ch. 9(B) (entitled "United States Support of
Venezuela"), at http://www.guyana.orgtfeatures/traiLdiplomacy.html (last visited Apr. 15,
2004); Message from the President to the U.S. Senate (1895) (statement of President Grover
Cleveland).
' The members of the 1896 Boundary Commission were David J. Brewer, Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court; Richard L. Albey, Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia; F.R. Coudert, a Spanish scholar; Dr. D.C. Gillman, President of Johns Hopkins
University; and Dr. D. White of Cornell University. Schoenrich, supra note 41, at 525.
' During this time Great Britain maintained colonial holdings or members of the British
Commonwealth in British Guiana, Belize (British Honduras), Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, the
British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, and Canada. See AREA HANDBOOK SERIES, supra note 15, at
125.
67 DAvID W. DENT, THE LEGACY OF THE MONROE DocrtINE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO U.S.
INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 365 (1999) (reasoning that the U.S.
government intervened on behalf of the Venezuelan interest to counter English power in Latin
America). Only a few years earlier, Great Britain established a sovereign king on the Moskito
coast, as a way to thwart American expansion in Panama, centered around completing work on
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Great Britain (for British Guiana) signed a treaty of arbitration with the
Republic of Venezuela signed in 1897.68 The Treaty of Arbitration laid the
foundation and purpose of the tribunal, and bound each side to the outcome of
the decision. The treaty also defined core concepts of law, to which the
Arbitration Panel was to be bound. The relevant portions are the following:
Article IV
In deciding the matters submitted, the Arbitrators shall ascertain
all facts which they deem necessary to a decision of the contro-
versy, and shall be governed by the following Rules, which are
agreed upon by the High Contracting Parties as Rules to be taken
as applicable to the case, and by such principles of international
law not inconsistent therewith as the Arbitrators shall determine
to be applicable to the case:
Rules
(a) Adverse Holding or prescription during a period of fifty
years shall make a good title. The Arbitrators may deem
exclusive political control of a district, as well as actual
settlement thereof, sufficient to constitute adverse holding or to
make title by prescription.
(b) The Arbitrators may recognize and give effect to rights and
claims resting on any other ground whatever valid according to
international law.
(c) In determining the boundary line, if territory of one Party be
found by the Tribunal to have been at the date of this Treaty in
the occupation of the subjects or citizens of the other party,
such effect shall be given to such occupation as reason, justice,
the trans-continental Panama Canal. Dent also asserts that, just as the United States had emerged
from colonialism, the foreign policy of the United States naturally identified with such
movements worldwide. Id. In 1901, following arbitration of the boundary dispute, the United
States again exerted pressure to sign a fifty-year old treaty renouncing sole rights to any trans-
continental canal over the Central American isthmus. See Veliz, supra note 36, at 443.
6 See Schoenrich, supra note 41, at 525; see also ROUT, supra note 37, at 21 (citing Report
of the Special Commission Appointed by President January 4, 1896 to Examine and Report upon
the True Division Line Between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana, S. DOC. No. 55-
91(1898)).
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the principles of international law, and the equities of the case
shall, in the opinion of the Tribunal, require.69
By Article XIII, the contracting parties agreed to consider the arbitral award
as the "full, perfect and final settlement" of the questions referred to the
arbitrators.70
The Venezuelan argument was that when Great Britain acquired British
Guiana in 1814, the Colony's boundary was the Essequibo River.71 This was
the frontier shown on various maps printed in London, and in particular by
Venezuelan maps depict this as the boundary line. The Venezuelan argument
also asserts that the British constituents mislabeled the Essequibo line and the
Schomburgk line, giving Britain credit for much more territory than was
originally demarcated by Schomburgk in 1834. "Essequibo line was the
original Schomburgk Line of 1835 as shown on the map that Schomburgk drew
before ie showed partiality for British interests. '72 The British view was that
they inherited the Dutch occupied areas, which were the Essequibo, Mazaruni,
Cuyuni, Moruka, Pomeroon, Waini, Barima and Amakura Rivers. This would
extend the overall British claim west of the Essequibo River and west of Point
Barima.73
On October 4, 1899 the Arbitration Panel published its decision in a
unanimous award. The line chosen by the tribunal was to begin at Point Playa,
forty-five miles east of Point Rivers and extended south along the Amacura
River. The award granted Great Britain nearly ninety percent of the territory
'9 See Treaty of Arbitration signed at Washington on Feb. 2, 1897 between Great Britain and
the U.S.V. and the Award of the Tribunal of Arbitration constituted under Article I of the Treaty,
dated Oct. 3, 1899, reprinted in MINIsTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFGUYANA, Documents on the
Territorial Integrity of Guyana: Guyana/Venezuela 7 (1981) [hereinafter Arbitration Treaty &
Award].
70 See ROUT, supra note 37, at 19. The tribunal to decide the Venezuelan-Guyana boundary
was convened in Paris in 1898. Five justices were appointed to hear the case. Lord Chief Justice
Russell and Lord Justice Collins of Great Britain, Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Brewer of the
U.S. Supreme Court, and the president of the panel was an academic named F. de Martens.
There were no Venezuelan representatives on the panel, nor any judges from South America.
The legal representatives from Great Britain were Sir Richard Webster, Attorney General of
Great Britain, and Sir Robert Reid, ex-Attomey General of Great Britain. The Venezuelan legal
counsel was conducted solely by lawyers from the United States, including ex-Secretary of War,
General Benjamin Tracy, Severo Mallet-Prevost, James Russell Soley, and headed by former
United States President Benjamin Harrison. BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10, at 180.
" ISHMAEL, supra note 64, ch. 3(D).
7 Id. ch. 3(D), para. 5.
" Id. ch. 3(E), para. 1.
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in dispute. Venezuela was awarded only the mouth of the Orinoco River and
a 5,000 square mile extension around Point Barima.74 In total, Great Britain
received 45,000 of the 53,000 square miles disputed. Little reference was
given to the constructive occupational realities in the award.75 The award
described the boundary line in vague terms and did not elucidate the construc-
tive occupation realities which supposedly were the spirit of the award and the
1897 Treaty to Arbitrate.76 As a Venezuelan legal analyst said at the time, "it
was exceedingly short, gave no reasons whatsoever for the decision and merely
described the boundary line approved by the Tribunal. 77
After the decision, Britain and Venezuela sent commissioners to survey the
area of the boundary in accordance with the award, and in 1905, both sides
accepted the Commission's report. The boundary was ratified by a map, seen







FROM14OEMSER 1900 TO 4UNE 104
SSee Schoenrich, supra note 41, at 526.
7 See Arbitration Treaty & Award, supra note 69.
76 Id.
" See Schoenrich, supra note 41, at 526.
78 Abraham Tirado and Elias Toro signed the map on Venezuela's behalf and H.I. Perkins
and C. Wilgress Anderson on Britain's behalf. The agreement of the commissioners was
recorded in a separate document signed a few days after the map was published. BRAvEBOY-
WAGNER, supra note 10, at 107.
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3. Modern Venezuela-Guyana Relations
The dispute was believed to be settled until the posthumous publication in
1949 of a memorandum by Mallet Prevost, one of the American jurists on the
1899 Paris Tribunal.79 In this declaration Prevost stated the result of the
tribunal was due to a secret deal between the British attorneys and American
judges. Prevost claimed that Venezuela had been unable to defend her rights
because British Guiana was still a British colony and Venezuela was too weak
as compared to Great Britain. The members of the tribunal feared that the
economic development of the area would also be hindered from growing into
one economic unit if an adverse decision was handed to Great Britain. After
the 1949 Prevost memo was published, the Venezuelan Government re-
asserted its claim for the Essequibo, citing the 1899 Award as a nullity under
international law."
Anticipating independence of Guyana from English rule, on February 17,
1966, representatives of Britain, Guyana, and Venezuela signed an agreement
in Geneva that established a border commission. The Commission, consisting
of two Guyanese and two Venezuelans, failed to reach an agreement.
However, both countries agreed to resolve their dispute by peaceful means as
stipulated in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter.8" On October 12, 1966,
Guyana discovered that Venezuelan military and civilian personnel had
occupied the Guyanese half of Ankoko Island in the Cuyuni River. 2 The
Venezuelans had begun developing an airfield and mining facilities on the
island. The Venezuelans hoped to seize this crucial island and utilize its
territorial sea before Guyana could discover its presence. Guyanese Prime
Minister Burnham protested the occupation and demanded Venezuela's
complete withdrawal and the removal of the facilities. Dismissing the protest,
Venezuela countercharged that Ankoko Island had always been Venezuelan
territory. With Guyana unable to force a Venezuelan withdrawal, Ankoko
Island remained occupied, and sporadic gunfire was exchanged between
Guyanese and Venezuelan military outposts.
" See Clissold & Hennessy, supra note 41, at 407.
'0 LARN H.JERTONSSON, THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 65 (1973).
s' See id.
82 Ankoko Island is located at the confluence of the Cuyuni and Venamo Rivers, roughly 100
miles south from the northern coast of South America. GEORGES A. FAURIOL, FOREIGN POuCY
BEHAVIOR OF CARIBBEAN STATES 143 (1984).
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In 1968, Venezuela claimed a twelve mile territorial sea beyond the
disputed territory,"a a straight base line drawn across the delta of the Orinoco
River. 4 Since the Essequibo region is disputed (the area now under Guyanese
control), this decree was meant to establish the baselines for Venezuela's
territorial sea in a sector enclosed between the dividing line of the Essequibo
River and Punta Araguapich, the northern tip of the delta. 5
The border commission could not resolve the dispute by the time its four
year term expired in 1970. Nonetheless, on June 18, 1970, the governments
of Venezuela, Britain, and Guyana signed an agreement to place a twelve year
moratorium on the border dispute. 6 This protocol, known as the Port-of-Spain
Protocol provided for continued discussions, a suspension of territorial claims,
and automatic renewal of the protocol if it remained uncontested after the
twelve years. In 1981, Venezuela announced that it would not renew the
protocol.8 7 Thus, for the past two decades no substantive progress has been
made in resolving this aspect of the dispute.88
B. Guyana-Suriname
1. Early Colonial Dispute
The disputes over the maritime area, New River Triangle, and Courantyne
River began during the colonial era, when Guyana was controlled by Great
Britain and Suriname was controlled by The Netherlands. 9 These colonial
83 See HJERTONSSON, supra note 80.
4 Decree No. 1152, July 9, 1968 (Venez.), cited in Kaldone G. Nweihed, Delineation
Principles and Problems, reprinted in FARROKH JHABvALA ET AL., MARrrIME ISSUES IN THE
CARIBBEAN 31 (1981). A 'baseline' is a straight line used to demarcate a claimed territorial sea
when a nation has a complicated coastline. Id.
8 Id.
86 See ROUT, supra note 37, at 98.
Border Disputes: Guyana-Venezuela Dispute (Jan. 1992), athttp://reference.allrefer.com/
country-guide-study/guyana/guyanal31.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2004). In 1981, the
Venezuelan president, Luis Hererra Camp, announced that Venezuela would not renew the
protocol. Relations again grew tense. Guyana's government accused Venezuela of massing
troops near their common border to invade Guyana. The Venezuelan government denied this
accusation, stating that its troops merely were involved in regular maneuvers. Id.
8 See ISHMAEL, supra note 64; All Quiet, GUYANA REV., Dec. 2003, at 32; Brakes Please,
VEN. ECON. WKLY., Feb. 25, 2004.
"9 The Netherlands, which at this time was known as the Batavian Republic, was ruled by
France between 1795 and 1813. When it achieved independence from France, it became what
is today known as The Netherlands. Vere T. Daly, Disposing of Mr. Pengel's Points, SUNDAY
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governments exercised direct control over their colonies and viewed the
territories as extensions of their states.' Possession of these colonies changed
through successive wars and raiding, and in the second Anglo-Dutch War, the
Dutch colonies of Berbice (in present day eastern Guyana) and Suriname came
under the firm control of England. 9 In 1799, the governors of the neighboring
provinces concluded that Berbice should control all territory up to the west
bank of the Courantyne River.92 This accord ("1799 Agreement") is the basis
of the modem Surinamese claim that the boundary between Guyana and
Suriname lies on the western bank of the Courantyne River, not the middle of
the river which is customary in international law.93
2. 1936 Mixed Commission
In 1936, officials from Great Britain and The Netherlands (referred to as
the Mixed Commission) addressed the problem of the river, maritime, and
inland boundary issues. A contention was the Dutch (and later Surinamese)
claim to the entire width of the Courantyne River was at odds with customary
international law. Generally, in international law, river boundaries between
CHRON., Mar. 10, 1968; 14 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 135 (1985).
"o See Thomas W. Donovan, Jurisdictional Relationships Between Nations and Their
Former Colonies, 1 ACROSS BORDERS INT'L L.J. 5 (2003). The fact that these colonies were
seen as extensions of the colonial state allowed the colonial power to be in charge of the
domestic and international commitments of the area, and to speak on its behalf. See PASQUAL
FIORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 431 (1929). Fiore asserts that "a protectorate may be deemed a
legitimate mode of acquiring territory inhabited by uncivilized tribes only when established in
accordance with the principles of international law." Id.
91 HENRY BOLINGBROKE, A VOYAGE TO THE DEMERARY, CONTAINING A STATISTICAL
ACCOUNT OF THE SETtlEMENT THERE, AND OF THOSE ON THE ESSEQUIBO, THE BERBICE, AND
OTHER CONTIGUOUS RIVERS OFGUYANA 108 (1809); Dwarka Nath, Guyana-Suriname Border
Dispute. ..", CARIBBEAN CONTACT, Dec. 1981, 3. British troops took over Berbice in 1796 and
Suriname in 1799. Id
'9 Id. at 121; The Guyana-Suriname Boundary Dispute, STABROEKNEWS, Oct. 17,2002; see
GUYANA-SURINAME BOUNDARY, supra note 24, para. 6.
" Guyana has since claimed that, although the 1799 Agreement was bilaterally ratified, the
proclamation did not constitute a formal boundary agreement. It asserts that the 1799 Agreement
was intended to be an interim agreement, lasting only until a final demarcation could be
established. There is evidence to substantiate this claim. The 1799 Agreement states, "some
arrangements by which all the ends wished for might be obtained without precluding the final
Regulations which, on determining the future fate of the Colonies, their Sovereign or Sovereigns
in time being, might judge proper to establish with respect to the Boundary." Ishmael, supra
note 5.
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nations are set in the middle of the navigable channel.' However, in 1936, the
Mixed Commission established boundary pillars not at mid-river, but on the
western bank of the Courantyne River following the 1799 Agreement.95
Because the 1936 Mixed Commission assumed the full width of the
Courantyne River to be Dutch Guiana territory, Guyana and Suriname agreed
to a point on the west bank (the so-called Kayzer-Phipps point or Point No. 61)
which would be the land boundary terminus. It is the consensus of many
commentators that the 1936 Mixed Commission asserted a 100 prolongation
of the territorial sea from Point No. 61." The modem notions of exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf were not envisioned in the original 1936
negotiation process but were addressed in the ensuing discussions. 9 The 1936
Mixed Commission stipulated that, for the abandonment of Dutch claims in the
New River Triangle, Dutch Guiana would be granted sovereignty of the entire
Courantyne River.9" This Treaty was not signed because of the Second World
War (which saw the German Government occupy The Netherlands).
"' R. Lauterpacht, River Boundaries: Legal Aspects of the Shau-AI-Arab-Frontier, 9 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 208, 216. The deepest point of the river principle has been applied in State of
New Jersey v. St. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 282 U.S. 458
(1940); and Arkansas v. Texas, 246 U.S. 158 (1918). The thalweg principle has also been
applied to dry river beds, known as wadis. See Mendelson & Hutton, Iraq-Kuwait Boundary
160 (1995).
91 STEPHENB.JONES, BOUNDARYMAKiNG: AHANDBOOKFORSTATESMEN, TREATYEDrrORS
AND BOUNDARY COMMIsSIONERS 117 (2000); Mohamed Hamaludin, Harassment in the
Corentyne River, SUNDAY CHRON., Feb. 5, 1978, 6, 32; S.W. BOGGS, INTERNATIONAL
BOuNDARiE (1940). The term for midpoint of the river, or deepest part of the river is thalweg,
which is used consistently through the different treaty negotiations. JONES, supra, at 118.
,' A 28" prolongation from Point No. 61 was originally claimed during the negotiations, but
a 10" trajectory was finally settled upon. This trajectory was only intended to cover a three mile
territorial sea. Hoyle, supra note 6; see also GUYANA-SURINAME BOUNDARY, supra note 24,
para. 18. Two names are used to describe the boundary pillars established by the 1936 Mixed
Commission: The Kayzer-Phipps Point (named after the Dutch Boundary Commissioner, Lt.
Kayser, and the English Boundary Commissioner, Phipps) and Point No. 61. Throughout this
paper Point No. 61 is used to describe the boundary pillars. The exact location of the boundary
pillars is 5059', 53.8"N, 57*08 ' 51.5"W. Hoyle, supra note 6, at 100. The 1936 Mixed
Commission defines the 10 extension as one country being responsible for the buoys marking
the navigable river channel. This responsibility can be used to infer sovereignty over marine or
land territory. MALcouM N. SHAw, INTERNATIONAL LAw 674 (4th ed. 1997).
97 See Hoyle, supra note 6, at 100.
98 See DAY supra note 8, at 380; White Paper Proves Triangle is Ours . GUYANA
GRAPHIC, Feb. 5, 1968; see also Hoyle, supra note 6, at 103.
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3. 1958-1962 Negotiations
After World War II, boundary negotiations between Suriname and Guyana
were recommenced in the late 1950s. During this time, the territorial seas of
a particular country were expanded from the three mile sea to twelve miles, as
stipulated by the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty.99 Distinctions
between territorial seas (a twelve mile extension of state sovereignty) and the
exclusive economic zone (an area where a state had the exclusive ability to
extract resources, but other nations could transport or ship) were drawn and
codified under international law."°°
In 1954, Britain claimed the continental shelf for British Guiana, and in
1958 granted a concession to the Standard Oil of California Corporation (later
Exxon) to operate in the far eastern "area of overlap."' ' This grant and claim,
if it is to be re-affirmed in modern boundary discussions, would extend the
Guyanese exclusive economic zone past the 10 line agreed to in the 1936
Mixed Commission. The reason for this apparent incongruity is that nothing
more than the three mile territorial sea was envisaged by the 1936 Mixed
Commission during its debates." 2
" Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
'00 See SURYAP P. SHARMA, TERRITORIAL ACQUISrTION, DISPUrES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
94 (1997). Taking into account treaties in determining the extent of continental shelf is
customary in international law. See D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONALLAW 184-88 (2d ed. 1976).
101 Alteration of Boundaries, Order in Council of 1954, Statutory Instruments, 1954, No.
1372, Colonies, Protectorates, and Trust Territories. See U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.B/6 at 48.
See HIERTONSSON, supra note 80, at 65. The 1954 British claim to the continental shelf was
intended to be used against Venezuela, but can be applied to the Suriname-Guyana instance as
well. During the 1950s, the British Government divided the continental shelf between British
Guiana and Venezuela in a treaty dated February 26, 1942. JURAJ ANDRASSY, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA 49 (1973). It was customary in this era to claim
continental shelf areas, even if there was no international statute allowing countries to claim
these areas. The United States claimed its Continental Shelf in the Caribbean in 1945 under
President Truman. The Truman Proclamation, White House Press Release Sept. 29, 1945, 13
DEPT. ST. BULL 485-486 (July-Dec. 1945), cited in IAN BROWNLEE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 (3d ed. 1979). The Truman Proclamation "expressed that the
submarine and subsoil was the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." Id. The ability to
claim a continental shelf was not codified until 1958 with the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf, but many nations believed it was customary to do so. ZDENEK J. SLOuKA,
INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF: A STUDY IN THE DYNAMICS OF
CUSTOMARY RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW x (1968).
,02 Suriname did not object to these concessions, although was probably aware of their
existence. Later drilling operations re-affirm this position. Shell drilled at one site in 1974 on
its concession in the area now disputed by Suriname. Shell relinquished its concession, but
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The final opportunity for the colonial powers to demarcate the maritime
boundary before independence came in 1961-1962. In this round of negotia-
tions British Guiana offered: (1) Dutch sovereignty over the entire Courantyne
River, (2) a 10* E line dividing the territorial sea, and (3) British Guianese
control over the New River Triangle. °3 In June, 1962 the Dutch rejected the
British proposal and responded anew with claims to the New River Triangle.'°"
The Dutch located the boundary in- the Courantyne River in the deep water
mark (thalweg0 5) rather than on the left bank as in the first draft.' °6 Its
response was contrary to the earlier positions and has not been reiterated by the
Suriname government since independence. This 1962 Dutch response is the
basis of Guyanese claims that the Courantyne River was unsettled at
independence. This response can be understood by the "Land Boundary
Component" whereby neither Dutch Guiana nor British Guiana has ever
indicated a willingness to concede their claimed maritime sea, if they were to
forego the New River Triangle.10
4. Independence of Suriname and Guyana from Colonialism
When Guyana became independent in 1966,0' the new nation asserted its
claim to the New River Triangle. Meanwhile, Dutch Guiana commenced
Guyana re-issued concessions in the same area to other parties. These concessions still exist and
operate today. See Hoyle, supra note 6, at 103.
"03 Id. at 104.
104 Id.
o5 Id. at 106.
10 The British were prepared to concede the 10" line (to a distance of six miles) so far as the
territorial sea was concerned because it was not considered to represent the median line. Id.
107 Id.
0I Guyana gained independence in 1966 and joined the United Nations the same year, at
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html. Guyana is also a member of CARICOM, The Law
of the Sea, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the World Bank Group. All international
agencies have methods of international dispute resolution. At independence Guyana laid claim
again to the New River Triangle in Article I of the new Constitution: "The Territory of Guyana
shall comprise all the areas that, immediately before 26th May, 1966, were comprised in the
former Colony of British Guiana together with such other areas as may be declared by Act of
Parliament to form part of the territory of Guyana." See 12 CONSTrrUTIONS OFTHE COUNTRIES
OFTHE WORLD (Gisbert H. Flanz ed. 1971); see also Pollard, supra note 26, at 217; Peggy A.
Hoyle, The Guyana-Suriname Maritime Boundary Dispute and Its Regional Context, IBRU
BOUNDARY & SECURITY BUIL Summer 2001, 99; Holland Dutch Troops Won't Help Pengel,
GUYANA GRAPtuC, Jan. 17, 1968.
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various activities to demonstrate its actual control over the region."°  For
example, in 1967, Guyana expelled Dutch surveyors thought to be conducting
preliminary sightings for a hydroelectric dam."' In mid-August 1969, the
Guyana Defense Force patrol expelled a group attempting to finish a
Surinamese airstrip west of the Courantyne River."' On August 19, 1969
skirmishes were reported west of the Courantyne River between the Guyana
Defense Forces and Surinamese individuals. On August 21, 1969, Prime
Minister Burnham informed the Guyana National Assembly stated that the
Guyana Defense Forces would stay in the New River Triangle." 
2
5. Modern Guyana-Suriname Relations
In 1988, the President of Suriname, Ramsaywak Shankar, and his Guyanese
counterpart, Desmond Hoyte, agreed to joint petroleum development in the
maritime area pending a final resolution of the border. ' This was codified in
the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding, providing for joint exploitation
pending a resolution of the final border and agreeing to respect concession
rights." 4 Negotiations proceeded through the 1990s, until Guyana unilaterally
granted new petroleum concessions in the area of overlap to Maxus, CGX, and
"0 Dr. Walston, a boundary negotiator for the British, stated that "on the New River Triangle
Her Majesty's Government maintain very firmly their sovereignty over the territory of British
Guiana as defined by its present frontier." One month later Guyana became independent having
as its boundaries the boundaries of British Guiana and as its sovereignty that which Britain had
exercised undisturbed for over a century. GUYANA-SURINAME BOUNDARY, supra note 24, para.
17.
11o See DAY, supra note 8, at 380.
"'I See Hoyle, supra note 6, at 98; see also GUYANA-SURINAME BOUNDARY, supra note 24,
para. 17; DAY, supra note 8, at 380; Rickey Singh, Suriname Sets Up a New River Outpost,
GUYANA GRAPHIc, Aug. 9, 1969; GDF, Dutch Troops in Bloodless Clash, GUYANA GRAPHIC,
Aug. 20, 1969; Surinamers' 'Outpost' was Really a Military Camp..., GUYANA GRAPHIC, Aug.
29, 1969.
112 See DAY, supra note 8, at 380; PM: Friendship with Suriname is Our Desire, GUYANA
GRAPHIC, Aug. 22, 1969. Shortly after the Prime Minister's declaration, the Guyana Defense
Forces (GDF) established a permanent military post called Camp Jaguar. This coincides with
other Amazon-based developmental schemes to populate border regions in dispute. Venezuela,
Colombia, and Brazil have all taken similar actions. See BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10,
at 192.
113 See GUYANA-SURINAME BOUNDARY, supra note 24, para. 18. The 'area of overlap' is
highly prospective for petroleum exploration, having the most concentration of petroleum. See
CGX Energy Homepage, supra note 35.
"' See Hoyle, supra note 6, at 100.
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Exxon in 1997-1999 without informing Suriname." 5 After CGX commenced
drilling, on June 3, 2000, two Suriname navy gunboats evicted them."6 The
Suriname government claimed that the oil platform was in Surinamese
territorial waters and in violation of the 1989 Memorandum of
Understanding. 
17
A few weeks prior to the expulsion, Suriname sent a Note Verbale to the
Guyana Government, asserting that the proposed CGX drilling would be in its
territorial waters."' The Suriname position reiterated that the boundary in the
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf was a straight line extension of
the 1936 line of 100 east of true north from Point No. 61.1 9 Guyana responded
by stating that any exploration activities carried out by CGX were in Guyana
territory and valid under the Hoyte/Shankar Agreement. 2 '
IV. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The following section describes the applicable legal principles involved in
Guyana's border disputes with Venezuela and Suriname. Part A describes how
a nation gains title to specific territory. Part B describes state succession
mechanisms whereby an emerging state inherits treaties and international
commitments of the previous government. Part C describes how an interna-
tional arbitration award may be declared a nullity and therefore not controlling.
Part D details notions of recognition, acquiescence, and estoppel in customary
international law. Part E describes prescription, the modern international law
equivalent of adverse possession. Part F details modern jurisprudence as to
maritime delineation, which is relevant to the offshore dispute between
Suriname and Guyana.
... CGX was granted the original license in 1998 by Guyana to carry out its oil drilling
operation in an area of some 15,464 square kilometers and said to have deposits of more than
800 million barrels of oil. See TRINIDAD GUARDIAN, Jan. 14, 2002.
116 Suriname Evicts Oil Rig, IBRU BOUNDARY & SECURITY BULL, Summer 2000; SOUTH
FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 16, 2002.
.. WALL STREET JOURNAI, Jan. 21, 2002.
118 Id.
9 d. The 10" extension is based upon the 1936 Mixed Commission. These negotiations
were never ratified but laid the framework for the 1958-1962 negotiations. See GUYANA-
SURINAME BOUNDARY, supra note 24, para. 19; see also Hoyle, supra note 6, at 100.
120 Id.
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A. Sovereignty Over Territory During Colonialism
Gaining title to the Essequibo or the New River Triangle will hinge upon
showing that during the colonial era the colonial power effectively controlled
the area. Towards this end Section 1 will discuss the principles of animus
domini and corpus, the twin elements of intent and actual control that must be
shown to demonstrate occupation during colonialism. Section 2 will discuss
the legal concept of terra nullius, its definition, application, and scope.
1. The Principles of Animus Domini and Corpus: Intent and Actual
Control of a Territory
International law sets forth two requirements for creating sovereignty and
control over sections of unoccupied land, animus domini (intent to control a
territory) and animus corpus (actual control of a territory). These elements
were originally delineated in the arbitral award between Brazil and Dutch
Guiana in 1904."2 The arbitration award stated "that in order to acquire
sovereignty over territory which is not under the control of any state, a state
must intend to control the territory, and this intent must be accompanied by
effective, uninterrupted, and permanent possession of the territory." '122
The animus domini element could be established upon behalf of the
colonial protectorate, as the colonial protectorates were viewed as extensions
of the state during the colonial era. According to Article 34 of the 1885 Treaty
of Berlin, "the state intending to assume a protectorate is obliged to notify the
other powers signatory to the act that it has undertaken a protectorate over the
country named; but, aside from such notification, the protectorate must become
effective.' 2.
2 The subsequent dispute was referred to King Vittore Emanuelle III of Italy for arbitration:
The colonies of Portugal and Spain were gaining independence throughout South America and
there were no uninvolved arbitrators to refer disputes. Once Brazil emerged from colonialism,
it attempted to ratify its borders, which included its northern border with Dutch Guiana. The
international agreement of May 5, 1906 (signed in Rio de Janeiro, approved by the law of July
11, 1908, and ratified on September 15, 1908, in The Hague) established the boundary between
Suriname and the Federal Republic of Brazil. hi
'1 id at 71.
" Article 34 of the Treaty of Berlin, in FIORE, supra note 90, at 431. Jurists in the colonial
era consistently asserted that a properly established colony or protectorate could acquire territory
for the colonial sovereign. Theodore Woolsey in International Law, writes that "title is derived
by immemorial occupation of land which was before vacant and by occupation of colonies is
then occupied." T-EoDORE DwiGHT WOOLSEY, INTERNATIONAL LAw 78 (1981).
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Sustaining an intent claim (animus domini) requires a strict review of
overt"" actions conducted by the ruling governmental authority. The ruling in
Eastern Greenland held that intent did not need to be a consistent inhabitation
and comprehensive creation of public services, but it did need to be an act that
a State entity needed to perform. 25 In sparsely populated and desolate areas,
animus domini could be as simplistic as reiterating in public a basic intent to
control the territory. 26 A State entity could be branches of the military (as
seen in Clipperton Island),27 state run commercial entities (such as the Dutch
East Indies Corporation in Island of Palmas), or public proclamations from a
ruling government-affiliated ministry (as in Eastern Greenland).28
The second element, known as animus corpus, is also necessary to
complete a claim of title over a given territory. Unlike the animus domini
element, which has not been reviewed extensively by arbitral panels, the
animus corpus element has received significant amount of review.'29 The
controlling and fundamental case where animus corpus was first detailed was
the Island of Palmas case in which control of a sparsely populated island in the
Pacific was disputed with the Netherlands. The United States asserted title
based on continuity of title (citing U.S. rule over the Philippines). Because of
this continuous transfer of title, the United States claimed, it was unnecessary
to prove displays of sovereignty. Conversely, the Netherlands asserted that its
predecessor in interest, the Dutch East Indian Company, maintained continu-
ous occupation since 1677, therefore the Netherlands had a first-in-time claim
to the island.'o
' See SHAW, supra note 96, at 343.
' See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.) (1933) P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53,
at 45-46.
126 Id. at 45-46.
27 Clipperton IslandAward, 26 AM. J. INT'LL. 390 (1932). Clipperton concerned a dispute
between France and Mexico over an uninhabited island. The arbitrator emphasized the nominal
acts which translated toward possession over the actual occupying and ruling of the island. In
the case, title was ultimately determined by the nominal act of a French Naval Officer
proclaiming the island to be French and publishing an article in a Honolulu newspaper. This was
deemed sufficient in creating valid title in this specific circumstance. See SHAW, supra note 96,
at 348.
" SHAW, supra note 96, at 348. If a non-state organ were to assert a claim for the title it
would have no legal effect and would not be taken into consideration by any international body.
Id. at 349.
12 The second element of corpus is dealt with in the Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.),
2 R.I.A.A. 829, 839 (Huber, Arb., Apr., 1928).
'1o Id.' at 830.
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In the Award, Judge Max Huber emphasized that occupation is defined as
the "actual display of state activities, such as belongs only to the territorial
sovereign."'' Judge Huber pointed out that there was, however, a different
test of corpus in the instances of "uninhabited and distant territories. ' '132 As
he stated, "manifestations of sovereignty over a small island and distant island,
inhabited only by natives, cannot be expected to be frequent.' ' 3 In instances
since this award, international tribunals have consistently required a lesser
showing of effective occupation of corpus, and instead look toward more
symbolic, rather than effective, instances of occupation. 34 Examples of such
functions are having a viable police force, 35 granting of hunting concessions
in a disputed area,136 and regulating fishing in claimed maritime areas. 137
Because both Guyana and Venezuela claimed the disputed Essequibo
region (Guyana through the colonial auspices of Great Britain and Venezuela
through Gran Colombia's claim to the eastern section of Venezuela), it is
necessary to look towards the constructive realities of occupation that existed
during the colonial era. One indicator of constructive occupation was the
existence of Spanish Missions in the area. There is considerable evidence that
such missions had been established near the tributary of the Yuruari River,
well within the disputed territory. 31 In a map detailing the area published in
"' Id. The court stated that elements such as tax rolls, jurisdictional legal courts,
administration, civil servants, etc., are signs of a government's effective occupation and control.
hd
132 Id.
' Id. at 830-39. This is the classical notion of effective occupation. In the exercise of
territorial sovereignty there are necessarily gaps, intermittence in time and discontinuity in space.
This phenomenon will be particularly noticeable in the case of colonial territories that are only
partly uninhabited. The fact that a state cannot prove or display sovereignty over an uninhabited
portion of territory cannot forthwith be interpreted as showing sovereignty is nonexistent. Each
case must be appreciated in accordance with the particular circumstances. Id. at 833-39.
" Matthew M. Ricciardi, Title to the Aouzou Strip: A Legal and Historical Analysis, 17
YALE J. INT'LL. 301, 385 (1992).
"3 Southern Boundary of the Territory of Walfisch Bay (Great Britain v. Germany), 104
BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAP. 50, 100 (May 23, 1911).
'" See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.) (1933) P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53,
at 45-46.
' See Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A., at 17.
13 See ISHMAEL, supra note 64. Ambassador Ishmael suggests that the number of Spanish
missions was a leading indicator in ascertaining the extent of corpus, or constructive occupation
realities that existed during the colonial era. The use of missions and missionaries to prove
constructive occupation is seen in other boundary disputes in South America such as
Colombia/Peru and Colombia/Panama. It has also been seen in the Libya/Chad example. Id.
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1748, a Spanish mission was depicted on a tributary on the left bank of the
Cuyuni. The site of an intended Mission at the mouth of the same creek was
also indicated. 139
Even so, the evidence of effective occupation demonstrated by the
Netherlands was more compelling. In 1757, the Commandant of Orinoco
complained to the Dutch authorities "of the evil conduct in Barima of traders
from Essequibo and Suriname."" The Director-General of the Netherlands
immediately implemented measures with the Suriname Government to deal
with this evil. It has been seen in the case of Eastern Greenland, that policing
an area is a valid demonstration of animus corpus, demonstrating not only the
intent but actual control of the area. There are also records of Dutch traders
in Point Barima as early as 1766.'41 In 1769, the Prefect of the Spanish
Missions reported that a Dutchman had been living since 1761 on the Aguirre
River, and that Dutch families had been living at the mouth of the Curumo. 42
In 1796, the Dutch settlements transferred to the English. The colonies had
been seized in 1781 by the British from whom they were later in the same year
taken by the French who subsequently abandoned them in 1784. The Dutch
resumed possession until the invasion by the British in 1796. In 1801, the
British Commandant was ordered to report on the extent of the colony (of
Essequibo). His report was illustrated by a chart which showed the boundary
commencing at Barima, and included the territories claimed by the Dutch in
their protests to the Spanish Government in 1759 and 1769.'
In terms of Guyana's boundary dispute with Suriname, because Suriname
and Guyana both intended to control the New River Triangle (thus satisfying
the animus domini element), any international tribunal's decision will hinge
upon an examination of actual control over the area. Because the New River
Triangle is much more isolated than the Essequibo, effective demonstration of
occupation occurred much later. In the twentieth century, it is clear that
Guyana has consistently demonstrated actual presence. It has maintained a
consistent presence of defense and military personnel, has granted concessions,
taxed such concessions, built a road into the area, and was originally awarded





143 Id. ch. 6(B).
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2. Terra Nullius
A critical issue in determining sovereignty over an area during the colonial
experience is establishing whether the land was terra nullius, defined as
"territory which belongs to no one."'" This means that such land must be
open for occupation because no one else is occupying it and fulfilling the
fundamental laws of occupation. Venezuela, Suriname, or Guyana may argue
the former colonial governments did not effectively occupy the disputed areas
because it was either inhabited by another European power or by a cohesive
indigenous society. In the absence of these tribes or other acts of European
animus domini or corpus, the territory would therefore have been terra nullius.
Thus, it could have been controlled by a colonial entity determined by the twin
elements of fundamental occupation.
In the Western Sahara case (1975), the International Court of Justice held
that territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having social and political
organization were not regarded as terra nullius.'4 s In such cases, sovereignty
was not acquired unilaterally through occupation. Rather, sovereignty could
be acquired through agreements with local rulers. Such agreements were
regarded as derivative roots of title, and not original titles obtained by
occupation of terra nullius.'46
a. Terra Nullius as Defined and Applied
Throughout the colonial era European scholars agreed that "any land that
was terra nullius was open to occupation.' 7 This was the justification for the
colonization of North and South America, Australia, and in some instances,
Africa.'" In the colonial era, terra nullius was seen as any part of the Earth's
surface which was not yet occupied by a central developed government. 49
14 SHAW, supra note 96, at 342.
"4 See 1975 I.C.J. 12.
' See id. at 43; Minquier and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, at 65-66. The doctrines
of adverse possession and prescription are similar in that they reward a party in equity, reflecting
the actual occupier of the land. See Western Sahara, para. 92.
t See Ricciardi, supra note 134, at 395.
148 See Minquier and Ecrehos, 1953 I.C.J. at 45-48.
141 See SHAw, supra note 96, at 355. The Australian case of Mabo v. Queensland dealt with
terra nullius in Australia when dealing with an indigenous population that was not organized,
coherent nor central. "Whatever differences of opinion there may have been among jurists, the
state practice of the [colonisation period] indicates that territories inhabited by tribes or peoples
having a social and political organization were not regarded as terra nullius." 66 A.L.J.R. 408
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However, to define "governing presence" and "central government" poses
certain problems. The majority of scholars agreed that non-European, but still
cohesive governments, such as China, Japan, and Turkey had claim to their
inhabited lands, not qualifying as terra nullius.' ° These non-western cultures
may not, it was argued, have achieved the developmental level of European
powers, but were still central and organized enough to maintain title over their
inhabited territory. 5'
There was debate, however, as to how much an indigenous people had to
be "developed" before they were accorded the same consideration. Whether
a land was considered terra nullius depended not on the land, but on the
European view of the developmental level achieved by the inhabitants.5 2 The
early twentieth century Italian jurist, Pasquale Fiore, presented that title to
territory could be established if the area was inhabited by "savage tribes" yet
required a treaty of cession from the tribes, no matter how slight, that these
tribes recognized colonial rule.' This "disguised form of conquest" '154
required the European settlers to negotiate a cession of title which could
include direct and indirect means for inducing the indigenous inhabitants to
yield territory to European colonialists. 55
In New River Triangle, neither the Dutch nor the English colonists
systematically explored the interior of their lands. Historical records
contradict accounts of the area and the inhabitants. Early records indicate that
(1992).
" A minority of scholars believed that if any substantive population inhabited an area that
land could not be terra nullius. See M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF
BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATONAL LAW 11-20 (1926); J. WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ONTHE
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 141-42 (1926).
"'t In the Lotus instance, France brought suit against the Turkish Government claiming that
it had violated its jurisdiction by a collision in the Mediterranean. It is assumed that since France
brought suit against Turkey, the colonial power of France conceded Turkey to be a cohesive
political unit. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. 131.
'52 Terra nullius was dealt with recently by the International Court of Justice in The Indo-
Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal (1968) 50 I.L.R. 2. Both India and Pakistan
submitted evidence of partial claims to a border area that was primarily wasteland, yet neither
submitted evidence that they claimed the entire area. In deciding this case, the justices asserted
that since both countries understood that the land was there, yet could not and did not exert
influence over the territory does not qualify the areas as terra nullius. Conversely, it can be
inferred that terra nullius is the land, which although it may be inhabited, must be not claimed
by any power, European or otherwise.
' See FIORE, supra note 90, at 423.
154 Id.
155 Id.
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Dutch traders went inland up to two hundred miles, yet were confined to the
waterways and tributaries of major rivers. No scientific expeditions were
convened until 1840, and even then, there were discrepancies in their findings.
However, in terms of the Essequibo, it is clear the early Dutch forces and later
British forces maintained a consistent occupation in the area, thus satisfying
the animus corpus element of occupation. The Dutch and then British forces
maintained and policed territory extending toward Point Barima.
b. Abandonment of Claims Reverting Back to Terra Nullius
The lack of records about the New River Triangle raises abandonment
issues. If a state abandons a territory after acquiring it, that territory reverts
back to terra nullius. International law, however, is unsettled as to what
objective acts determine abandonment. The question is crucial in the New
River Triangle, because it could potentially be argued by either Suriname or
Guyana that the occupied positions in the area were occupied and subsequently
abandoned. Abandonment principles do not apply to the Essequibo territory,
as there has been continuous animus domini on both the Venezuelan and
Guyana side, and effective control had also consistently been enforced by
England.
The majority of scholars state that to find a territory effectively abandoned,
both physical abandonment and the desertion of animus domini must occur. 56
Jurists have, however, allowed exceptions. For example, when an uprising
occurs that drives government forces from a particular area, it is considered
abandonment if the government fails to return in sufficient time even when
conditions otherwise permit the return.' 57 If, on the other hand, general
withdrawal from an area occurs without force, abandonment would be seen if
the government does not return after a sufficient length of time, even if it
expresses the intention to return at some future date. 5 '
c. The Range of Occupied Territory under Terra Nullius
In dealing with the concept of terra nullius, it is important to note the
extent of the unoccupied land. According to the traditional view, a state could
claim no more territory than it effectively occupied. An alternative view
156 See Ricciardi, supra note 134, at 407.
151 See LINDLEY, supra note 150, at 428.
158 id.
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suggests that a country is entitled to control not only the land that it effectively
has title to, but also a hinterland.1 59 This theory claims that non-occupied
hinterlands may be attached to occupied colonial possessions when one of
three factors occur. These are "geographical proximity, natural features, or
strategic need.' ' "W Hinterland theories have been asserted in the Guianas
during the 1899 Paris Arbitration regarding the maritime and territorial
boundaries between British Guiana and Venezuela.
In the first consideration used in hinterland theory, geographical continuity
is used to justify a claim to unoccupied territory that was adjacent to the
previously inhabited and structurally occupied area. Jurists generally denied
that proximity alone without effective occupation could support valid title.
They argued that if proximity conferred upon a state superior faculties for
occupying a territory, that the state should exercise those faculties. In the
Island of Palmas award, Judge Huber addressed the contiguity theory and
concluded that it had "no foundation in international law."'' Huber wrote that
this principle is "by its very nature... uncertain, '', 6 and that it conflicted with
the clear requirement in international law of effective occupation. Huber thus
concludes that even isolated displays of occupation would defeat claims based
on a hinterland theory. 63
In the second justification to include a hinterland, natural features allow
states to invoke claims based on geographical contiguity extending to a
geographic natural boundary. Prominent natural boundaries such as oceans,
mountains and rivers created natural boundaries that allowed for easy
demarcation and division. Britain claimed the natural boundary theory in the
1899 British Venezuela-Guiana Arbitration.'"' Britain wanted to use the
natural boundaries to divide Guyana and Venezuela because they are "both
159 Hinterland as used in this context applies to territory which, while known to the colonial
or administering power, is not effectively controlled under western notions of territorial
sovereignty. See Ricciardi, supra note 134, at 404.
160 Id.
61 See Island of Palmas Case (U.S. vs. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. at 829.
162 Id
163 Id. Fiore argues that the extent of occupied land must extend to "areas which the
occupying state has granted the use, under private title to individuals." See FIORE, supra note
90, at 426. Fiore argues implicitly that hinterland claims will be defeated by the showing of
effective control and that a European colonial power in extending title to territory must indeed
assert the intent to occupy the territory and the actual occupation of that territory. Id. at 426-27.
164 Clifton J. Child, The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration, 44 AM.J. INT'LL.
682 (1950); see also William Cullen Dennis, Editorial Comment, The Venezuela-British Guiana
Boundary Arbitration of 1899, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 720 (1950).
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easy to distinguish and hard to cross."'' 65 Britain asserted hinterland theories
based on ethnic and racial divisions. Yet, Fiore declared that even in cases
where there existed linguistic, ethnic and geographical consistency with the
hinterland, international law has always stated that the claiming state must
effectively occupy the territory within a reasonable time."
The third justification for hinterland extensions is that the area is needed
for the safety and security of the state. During the negotiations in the 1885
Conference of Berlin, the British delegate was ordered to assert "as a 'general
principle . . . if a nation has made a settlement it has a right to assume
sovereignty over all the adjacent vacant territory which is necessary to the
integrity of the settlement.' ,167 However, this theory has gained little respect
from international panels. According to Fiore, acquisitive prescription "may
find application in connection with possessions acquired by conquest, colonial
protectorate, or by means of spheres of influence (hinterland) although these
measures do not constitute a legitimate mode of acquisition." '168
If no other state claims a hinterland, an international tribunal will most
likely grant title as long as there is some show of occupation.'69 In Eastern
Greenland, for example, no other state challenged Danish control over a
hinterland claim, and therefore, solely on the basis of Danish domestic
legislation decreeing control over the territory, the area was Danish. '70 There
was no evidence of the actual display of sovereignty.' In framing this
decision, the Court noted the need to take into account "the extent to which the
sovereignty is also claimed by some other power.'17 The Court laid particular
emphasis on the fact that until 1921 no other state had either disputed
'6 See Ricciardi, supra note 134, at 407. The natural boundary theory was discussed in the
Hanish Island Award between Yemen and Eritrea in dealing with a group of islands in the Red
Sea. Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Eri. V. Yomen) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1998),
available at http://pca-cpa.org/English/Rpc/ERITERIA (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1998). The Yemeni
pleadings describe the islands as being contained within the same "principle of natural or
geophysical unity." Id. ch. X, para. 460. The International Arbitral Panel asserted that this
natural boundary theory is "not an absolute principle." Id. para. 461.
' See FIORE, supra note 90.
167 Ricciardi, supra note 134, at 407-09 (citing Telegram from Lord Granville to Sir Edward
Malet (Jan. 14, 1885)).
' FIORE, supra note 90, at 430.
'" See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.) (1933) P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53,
at 46.
"70 Id at 46-48.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 46.
[Vol. 32:661
2004] CHALLENGES TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF GUYANA 695
Denmark's claim to the area or asserted a claim themselves.173 Given the
"absence of any claim to sovereignty by another power, and the Arctic and
inaccessible character" of the area, Denmark's scant acts of occupation were
deemed enough to be granted title to the territory.
7 4
B. State Succession and Inheritance of International Commitments
State succession is defined as "the replacement of one state by another in
the responsibility for the international relations of territory."'75 This can occur
through dissolution, revolution, merging, conquering, surrendering, or
federation.'76 It occurred when Venezuela succeeded from Spanish rule,
Suriname succeeded from rule by the Netherlands, and the Republic of Guyana
emerged from British colonial rule in 1966. State succession always leads to
several questions that must be resolved. Should the emerging government be
liable for the debts of the former government? What happens to state owned
land? Are treaty obligations of the former state to be honored by the new one?
The 1897 Treaty to Arbitrate signed by Venezuela and Great Britain
acknowledges the state succession mechanisms. The Treaty said the role of
the Tribunal is to "investigate and ascertain the extent of territories belonging
to, or that might lawfully be claimed by The Netherlands or by the Kingdom
of Spain respectively at the time of acquisition by Great Britain of the colony
of British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela."' 77
173 Id.
171 Id. at 50-51. This case is confirmed and contrasted by the Island of Palmas, where it
states explicitly that hinterland theories of state sovereignty are not valid when they compete
with another nation's claim to the same territory. See Island of Palmas Case (U.S. vs. Neth.),
2 R.I.A.A. at 839-40. It is possible to reconcile the two cases by noting the extreme isolation
of Greenland experienced by in Denmark as contrasted to the Island of Palmas, which contained
various population centers that were intermittently inhabited. Eastern Greenland is then
considered the first international arbitral award to sanction hinterland possession in the absence
of conflicting claims. In these rare instances, it is therefore possible to claim large tracts of
hinterland territories with small acts of occupation. Id.
115 See SHAW, supra note 96, at 676. It is seen where a former state disappears in whole or
in part and is succeeded by another state occupying roughly the same territory of the original
sovereign. See D.P. O'CoNNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1967); see also IAN BROWNuE, PRINCIPLES OFPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 28 (4th
ed. 1990).
17 Rein Mullerson, The Continuity and Succession of States, by Reference to Former USSR
and Yugoslavia, 42 INT'L &CoM. L.Q. 473 (1993).
'77 Arbitration Treaty & Award, supra note 69, para. 6.
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In the following discussion about state succession, Part I describes state
succession mechanisms when an international treaty specifically deals with a
boundary in question. Part 2 discusses state succession mechanisms when a
state is gained through conquest. Part 3 describes the legal concept of uti
possedetis whereby a former colonial government inherits its borders at
independence.
1. State Succession Regarding International Treaties Dealing with
Boundaries
The extent to which the new state will be bound to all external obligations
varies. However, it is clear that customary international law views boundary
treaties as having a special permanence, binding subsequent states to the
original terms. 7 ' The objective of this rigid stance in international law is that
in the field of state succession, there must be a "minimum disruption and
instability" to the world order.'79 That is, in most instances international law
will bind the successor states to the obligations of the former states, particu-
larly when a boundary is at issue. In most non-violent cases of state succes-
sion, there are multilateral treaties dealing with territorial dispositions that
allow a smooth transition between state successors. Bi-lateral treaties between
the former colonial power and the former state also have considerable
precedent in international law.' For example, in the northern South American
context, Spain, the Netherlands, and Great Britain all ratified bilateral treaties
with the emerging states. These colonial treaties provided in general that "all
rights and benefits, obligations and responsibilities devolving upon the
colonial power in respect of the territory in question, arising from valid
international instruments, would therefore devolve upon the new state."''
Viewing a boundary with a stricter sense of permanence than most treaties
often has foundations in many fundamental international treaties. It is seen in
Article 62(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which
stipulates that a fundamental change in circumstances may not be invoked as
a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty which establishes a
178 See SHAW, supra note 96, at 674.
179 See id.
Io See id.
" Id. at 675. Shaw cites the 1975 U.K.-Burma Agreement of 1947 as evidence of
concluding through treaty that the new state would have all rights, and consequently duties and
obligations of the former colonial government in respect to the territory of the successor state.
Id.
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boundary.8 2 In addition, Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on Succession
from Treaties, asserts that "a succession of states does not as such affect (a) a
boundary established by a treaty; or (b) obligations and rights established by
a treaty and relating to the regime of a boundary."'8 3
In terms of case law, the International Court of Justice dealt with succession
to boundary treaties generally in the Libya-Chad case, where it asserted that
"[o]nce agreed, the boundary stands, for any other approach would vitiate the
fundamental principle of the stability of boundaries, the importance of which
has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court."'"4  Directly referring to
concluding a boundary by international treaty or arbitration, the Court held that
a boundary established by a treaty thus achieves a permanence
which the treaty itself does not necessarily enjoy. The treaty can
cease to be in force without in any way affecting the continuance
of the boundary .... when a boundary has been the subject of an
agreement, the continued existence of that boundary is not
dependent upon the continuing life of the treaty under which the
boundary is agreed.8 5
2. State Succession Through Conquest
Modem international law defines conquest as "the act of defeating an
opponent and occupying all or part of its territory."" 6 Simple conquest over
another sovereign, however, does not automatically create title to territory
under international law. Title is retained by the displaced sovereign. Gaining
title through conquest over land raises the critical question as to what extent
may an illegal act (aggression) "give birth to complete title to land."
International law, according to Shaw, must "modify its reactions to the
consequences of successful violations of its rules to take into account the
" Id. at 684; see also Article 5 of the Minsk Agreement (establishing the Commonwealth
of Independent States on December 8, 1991, Alma Ata Doctrine which re-affirmed the territorial
boundaries of the state succession states which evolved from the former administrative
boundaries of the USSR), available at http://www.rulg.comdocuments/PresentationlegaL.
Status-caspianJEAAprAl5-03.doc (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
183 See SHAW, supra note 96, at 684-85.
18 Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 l.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3).
I [d.
126 See SHAW, supra note 96, at 340.
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exigencies of reality."' 7  According to most jurists gaining title to this
displaced land would require either widespread international recognition of the
new sovereign, or a treaty of succession between the displaced sovereign and
the conquering sovereign.' Pasquale Fiore defined annexation as "when an
autonomous state [is] incorporated into another voluntarily or by force, [and]
all of its territory becomes an integral part of the state to which it is
annexed."'8 9 This territory must be considered as in the legal possession of the
state to which it is annexed.'9
Because conquest was often used as a means of territory acquisition in
South American colonial times, it is useful to consider the way a colonial
nations viewed conquest as a legal act. Early colonial nations distinguished
between the "necessary law of nations" (the law which results from applying
the natural law of nations) and the "voluntary law of nations" which is the
positive element of international law whose rules are devoted to the welfare
and advancement of the universal society. The former applies to the sover-
eign's legal ability to settle disputes through warfare. As Vattel asserted,
"[t]he method of settling disputes by force is a sad and unfortunate expedient
to be used against those who despise justice and refuse to listen to reason, but
after all, it is a method which must be adopted when all others fail."''
Therefore, European nations viewed conquest as a legal, although regrettable,
means of settling disputes and consequently gaining title to territory.
The "necessary law of nations" is also considered one of the key elements
in creating a balance of power within the European continent and preventing
aggressive wars among the various States. Since public law of Europe after
1648 was still developing and the states were not yet ready to abandon their
187 Id. An international treaty acknowledging defeat and the intent suffices as to when
conquest in modern international law creates title to subjugated land. See also M.J. PETERSON,
RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTs: LEGAL DOCTRINE AND STATE PRACTICE 1815-1995, 185
(1997). Peterson asserts that a state may also perform an act of recognition, short of an
international treaty which may suffice as intent to abandon the subjugated territory. Id.
"'t See SHAW, supra note 96, at 342. The United Nations Security Council has also
condemned Israel for asserting jurisdiction over the Golan Heights. See SCOR Res. 497, U.N.
SCOR, 36th Sess., 2319th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/497 (1981). It has also condemned Israel's
establishment of settlements in conquered land. See SCOR Res. 465, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess.,
2203d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/465 (1980).
189 See FIORE, supra note 90, at 422.
" Id. at 423. Fiore cites the examples of the independent state of Texas annexed by the
United States in 1845 and Hanover being incorporated into Prussia in 1866. Id.
191 EmER DE VA-rrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 243
(Charles G. Fenwick trans., Classics of International Law ed. 1916) (1758).
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right to war, there were few if any means of preventing war between the
sovereign powers of Europe. One way was to attain a state of equilibrium
between them In the absence of a rule of law prohibiting aggressive war, the
system of balance of power, given the alternative, was simply based upon
"dividing Europe into States almost equal in order that their forces being in
balance, they will fear to offend one another, and hesitate to plan too great
designs." '192 That would mean that states, while in theory retaining their moral,
if not legal, right to war were effectively constrained from doing so. It has
been rightly stated that "the States were so bounded and organized that
aggression could not succeed unless it was so moderated and so directed that
the prevailing opinion of the Powers approved it."' 93
This did not occur until there were imbalances of power, such as when
England established military superiority over the Dutch and acquired their
holdings in Berbice, Essequibo, and Pomeroon in 1796. " This early conquest,
and the successive Dutch-English wars that followed it, gave title to the
English, as codified in the Treaty of London and the Treaty of Amiens. The
Dutch colonies of Pomeroon, Berbice, and Essequibo, thus became firmly in
English hands when it ruled Guyana through British Guiana. The recognition
treaty that Great Britain and the Republic of Guyana ratified upon its
independence in 1966 transferred this territory.
3. Uti Possidetis
The doctrine of utipossidetis is the most essential operative legal principle
in Guyana's border disputes. The concept originated in South America when
former colonies of Spain and Portugal were emerging into independence.' 95
192 Id.
93 Quincy Wright, International Law and the Balance of Power, 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 97, 97
(1943).
'9' See ISHMAFL, supra note 64, ch. 6(B). Although the areas changed hands back to The
Netherlands and were subsequently re-conquered by the English, a state succession mechanism
applies in each instance. Noting the state succession elements as seen in the Libya/Chad
instance, although there might be successive inheritors to the same area, state succession is still
applied to each actor, and succession of title is inherited by all when dealing with boundary
disputes.
19 CRISTIANE SIMMIER, DAS UTIPOSSIDETIS PRINZIP: ZURGRENZZIEHUNGZWISCHENNEu
ENTSTANDENEN STAATEN 276 (1999); see also Case Concerning Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso
v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22). Conference on Yugoslavia, 92 I.L.R. 162 (E.C. Arbitration
Comm'n.1991); Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v.
Hond.), 97 I.L.R., 266, 351, 514, 598 (1992).
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It states that a country gaining independence from colonial rule inherits the
original borders of the previous state." However, if the former colonial
powers maintained unresolved borders before independence, then the new
republics inherit the unresolved claim at issue. 97 It has been applied in the
northeastern section of South America in cases of Venezuela from Spain, Cuba
from Spain, and Brazil from Portugal.'98
This section will discuss the doctrine of uti possidetis, its historical
development, recent application, and related case law. This section asserts that
since the border in the New River Triangle was not resolved during the
coloniai rule, neither Suriname nor Guyana can claim title to the area
incorporating solely a claim of utipossidetis. However, utipossidetis does not
preclude inheriting the original animus domini and animus corpus exhibited
by its colonial predecessor in the New River Triangle. In terms of the
Courantyne River, the successor state of Suriname inherited the historic title
of the 1799 Agreement, and therefore may extend complete sovereignty over
the river and contained islands, and also reaffirm Point No. 61 as the land
boundary terminus. This would suggest a 10' extension into the territorial sea,
as envisaged in the 1936 Mixed Commission and claimed by Suriname, is
appropriate. However, Guyana could likewise inherit the 1954 British claim
to the continental shelf, the ability to grant concessions in the far eastern 'area
of overlap' as seen in the 1958 Shell and Exxon concessions, and the original
animus domini and animus corpus that was noted by the 1936 Mixed Boundary
Commission in the New River Triangle. In terms of the Essequibo, Guyana
would inherit the Dutch/English settlements as inferences of constructive
occupation in the administrative territories of former succession in title states.
Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possedetis and the Borders of New States,
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 590 (1996); see also Michael Reisman, International Decision: The
Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Republic of Yemen, Award of the
Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of the Proceedings (Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the
Dispute), 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 688 (1999).
97 Catharine A. Hartzenbusch, Recent Development, International Litigation: Land, Island,
and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), Gen. No. 75, 1992 I.C.J. (Judgment of
Sept. 11) (Nicaragua intervening), 34 HARv. INT'L L.J. 241 (1993); see also SHAW, supra note
96, at 676.
198 See S[MMLER, supra note 195, at 47. The uti possidetis principle was recognized in the
Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties 1978, which provides that
treaties establishing boundaries are an exception to the general rule that successor States start
with a clean slate in respect of treaties entered into by their predecessors. Id.
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The .doctrine of uti possidetis99 is closely related to the doctrine of state
succession,"° whereby one state displaces another in an area by means of a
treaty.2 1 It is distinct, however, because state succession does not directly
apply to international boundaries of the successor state. The doctrine of uti
possidetis, in these instances, refers directly to the inheritance of boundaries
at state succession from colonialism.
20 2
The International Court of Justice dealt with uti possidetis in the Case
Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali). 23 Here,
the court held that uti possidetis was "a firmly established principle of
international law where decolonization is concerned."2 4 The court further
stated that
[u]tipossidetis, as a principle which upgraded former administra-
tive delimitations, established during the colonial period, to
international frontiers, is therefore a principle of a general kind
which is logically connected with this form of decolonization
wherever it occurs.205
Most scholars agree that there are two distinct versions of uti possidetis.206
Through the first mechanism of uti possidetis juris, boundaries "are defined
according to legal rights of possession based upon the legal documents of the
former colonial power at the time of independence. 20 7 Uti possedetis juris
was seen in the Colombia-Venezuela Arbitration in 1922.20 In this award, the
'" Utipossidetis translates to "as you possess, so you may possess." See SHAw, supra note
96, at 676.
200 See id State succession is dealt with in Article 2 of both the Vienna Conventions of 1978
and 1983 and Opinion No. 1 of the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission, 92 I.L.R. 162, 165. The
foremost International Court of Justice decision is Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal, 83 I.L.R., pp. 1,
22 and Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 97
I.L.R. at 19-26.
21 Badinter Commission in Opinion No. 3 in 1992 delineating the boundaries between Serbia
and Yugoslavia. See Peter Radam, Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis
of the Opinions of the Badinter Commission, 24 MELBOURNE U. L. REv. 50 (2000).
202 Id. at 10.
13 See Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.),
97 I.L.R. at 19-26.
2 Id. at 565.
2w Id. at 566.
2 See Radam, supra note 201, at 59.
W id.
28 Honduras Borders (Guatemala v. Hond.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1307, 1322 (1933). Examples of
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court held, "[tihe principle of [uti possidetis] laid down the rule that the
boundaries of the newly established republics would be the frontiers of
Spanish provinces which they were succeeding . . . . These territories,
although not occupied in fact ... were by common agreement as considered
as being occupied in law."'  Therefore in an utipossidetisjuris setting, a state
could lay claim to an area, which, although it is not exactly administering it,
was within the territorial notions of the former Spanish administrative division.
A second version of uti possedetis defacto was seen in the later case of El
Salvador-Honduras, where that court held that borders may be demarcated by
territory that was "actually possessed and administered by the former colonial
unit at the time of independence, irrespective of the legal definition of former
colonial borders., 210  In this case, the court dealt with a boundary award
between three states that had ratified international treaties determining the
applicable law. The International Court of Justice held that the ruling in the
Burkina Faso-Mali instance does not apply "if parties to any dispute...
specifically agree to the contrary that the principle of utipossidetis should not
be applied. 2 1' Therefore, in an uti possidetis de facto setting, a state could
only claim an area that the former colonial division administered and
controlled.
treaties stipulating the application of utipossidetis include: Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, Aug. 30, 1855, Arg.-Chile, 113 333, art. 39; Treaty between Colombia and
Venezuela for the Arbitration of the Boundary, Sept. 14, 1881, Col.-Venez., 159 U.S.T. 87, art.
1; Bonilla-Gomez Treaty: Border Demarcation Convention, Oct. 7, 1894, Hond.-Nic., 180
U.S.T. 347, art. 2(4); Treaty of Arbitration, Dec. 30, 1902, Bol.-Peru, 192 U.S.T. 289, arts. 1 and
5; Treaty of Arbitration, July 16, 1930, Guat.-Hond., 132 BFSP 823, art. 5.
209 Colombia-Venezuela Arbitration, 1922 U.N.R.I.A.A. 223, 288. The court upheld the
concept of uti possidetis juris in the later case of El Salvador-Honduras, by stating that "uti
possidetis juris is essentially a retrospective principle, investing as international boundaries
administrative limits intended originally for quite other purposes." Case Concerning the Land,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 97 I.L.R. at 388. El Salvador-Honduras
applied uti possidetis principles to maritime as well as territorial title to land.
210 id.,
211 See DAY, supra note 8, at 380. The application of uti possidetis goes beyond simple
colonialism. It has been seen in the fragmentation of the USSR. See Roman Yakemtchouk, Les
Conflits de Territoires and de Frontieres dans les Etats de I'Ex-URSS AFDI (1993). Uti
possidetis has also been seen in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. See Jiri
Malenovsky, Problemes Juridiques Lies a la Partitionde la Tchecoslovaquie, AFDI 328 (1993).
The territorial concepts and boundaries of the formercolonial power are often accompanied with
other forms of governance that are implanted in the colonial country.
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The principle of uti possidetis applies to territorial as well as maritime
zones.2 2 The principle can be applied to the Suriname-Guyana context by
inheritance of the 1799 Agreement for the Courantyne River. Uti possidetis
asserts that where there is a relevant applicable treaty, an international frontier
achieves a status of permanence so that even if the treaty itself were to cease
to be in force, the continuance of the boundary would be unaffected and may
only be changed with the consent of the states directly concerned.2" 3
Therefore, the 1799 Agreement, even though not in force, defines the boundary
between Suriname and Guyana, because neither government has proactively
recognized a dividing line following the middle part of the river since the
Agreement.
Inheritance of the entire Courantyne River would therefore reaffirm the
land boundary terminus of Point No. 61 on the West Bank of the Courantyne.
If the 1936 Mixed Commission or the 1958-1962 negotiations had ratified the
Treaty, a 100 extension into the territorial sea (to the three-mile limit) would
have been inherited by the new Republics. As this is not the case, the question
arises as to who actually controlled the territorial waters during the late
colonial era. This corpus, or actual control of the area, could be inherited
through uti possidetisjuris to the successor states. As the record marginally
indicates, since Suriname maintained trawling and fishing rights to the mouth
of the Courantyne, Suriname may assert an uti possidetis juris argument that
Dutch Guiana's occupation of the mouth of the Courantyne re-affirms the 100
extension in the territorial sea as seen in the unratified 1936 Mixed Commis-
sion.
If utipossidetisjuris is applied to the outlying exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf areas, Guyana inherits a de facto maritime delineation that
incorporates a 1954 British claim of the continental shelf. Moreover, British
Guiana granted two specific concessions which were not objected to by
Suriname before independence, and Guyana has subsequently awarded
numerous concessions without timely objection by Suriname. Reconciling a
100 Suriname territorial sea with a 33* Guyanese exclusive economic zone will
be a difficult task for any international tribunal. One solution is a maritime
delineation which, although possibly projecting at 100 immediately from the
22 The International Court of Justice has emphasized that the utipossidetis principle applies
to territorial as well as boundary problems. See Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 97 I.L.R. at 387.
23 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahirya v. Malta), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 23 (citing Special
Agreement between Tunisia and Libya, art. 1).
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shore, would move towards the Guyanese position of 330 past the territorial
sea. This solution would respect the concession rights given by each country.
Another solution is to impose an equidistant median line through the area, a
common practice in offshore boundaries. In practice, such a "median line" is
a set of line segments. The outlying continental shelf and exclusive economic
zone are located past the territorial sea. At this distance, the location of the
median line is completely unaffected by the demarcation of the boundary in the
territorial sea, whose line of demarcation would be bound on separate points.
In terms of the New River Triangle, Guyana could make a strong claim to
title based upon uti possidetisjuris, which asserts that even though Guyana did
not effectively administer the territory in dispute during the colonial period, it
still may inherit the lands which it effectively occupied. This effective
occupation will be determined by the dual criteria of animus domini and
animus corpus, which dictate how a colonial state may lay claim to title in
lands that are terra nullius. In doing so, the animus domini and animus corpus
will be. judged against a similar Suriname claim that Dutch Guiana also
exhibited these objective notions. Any tribunal will, however, overlook the
intermittence of Dutch outlying settlements and concentrate on the clear,
consistent, and objective showings of state sovereignty exhibited on behalf of
British Guiana and, by the principle of uti possidetis juris, the Republic of
Guyana.
In terms of the Essequibo, uti possidetis juris would award clear title to
Guyana. The Dutch territories that were conquered by the British and
inherited by the Republic of Guyana are clear indications of constructive
occupation within the former territorial administrative regions of a former
colonial power. This would be a direct application of uti possidetis, which as
seen through case law, is directly applicable to South America and the former
colonial holdings of European nations. The existence of Spanish missions in
the Essequibo would be unlikely to be as persuasive evidence of construction
occupation as compared to the extent that Guyana has developed the area. It
was seen in the Island of Palmas case where, clear showings of effective
control and constructive occupation defeat a title solely predicated upon the
intent or animus domini aspect of title. Therefore the Essequibo, as gained by
the Dutch and later British forces, will be inherited by the Republic of Guyana
under uti possidetis juris mechanisms.
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C. The Binding Nature of Arbitration Awards
In twentieth century boundary disputes, most nations accept and adhere to
the final decisions of arbitration panels. Each party binds itself to the decision
of the arbitration panel, regardless of a beneficial or adverse outcome, and
empowers the arbitrator with binding international decision-making capability.
The states submitting to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator panel must be
prepared for an adverse decision, or they would not have submitted at all.
Nevertheless, there are numerous examples of countries objecting to the
final decision of the arbitration panel. They tend to seek other means to avoid
or circumvent the decisions they had previously agreed to follow. In the
British Guiana-Venezuela context, Venezuela asserts that the 1899 Arbitral
Award is a nullity and void. Article 35 of the Model Rules on Arbitral
Procedure drafted by the International Law Commission indicate three
instances in which an arbitral award may be declared a nullity and therefore
invalid: (1) excess of power, (2) corruption of a tribunal member, and (3)
departure from fundamental rules of procedure." 4
1. Excess of Power of the Tribunal
Jurists are consistent in stating that excessive power of a tribunal is grounds
for the nullity of the consequential award. 5 Before arbitrating an issue, a
compromis (also called compromiso) is created detailing the limits and extent
of applicable power given to the tribunal. If the decision of the tribunal
exceeds this compromis, then the decision may be a nullity based upon the
legal doctrine of exces de pouvoir (excess of power)." 6 The compromis, as
seen in the Venezuela-Guyana instance is the 1897 Treaty to Arbitrate which
established the applicable law, defined key terms, and outlined the extent of
power by the tribunal." 7
..4 Oscar Schachter, Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions, 54 AM.
J. INT'LL. 1 (1960); see also SHAW, supra note 96, at 741.
215 See CHARLEs CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATiONAL LAw 1163-40 (2d ed. 1945). Excess of a
tribunal is dealt with in two other boundary awards, The Panama-Costa Rica Boundary Case, I I
R.I.A.A., 1900, p. 519 and The Chamizal Case, 11 R.I.A.A., 1900, p. 519.
216 KENNETH CARISTON, THEPROCESS OFINTERNATIONALARBITRATION 87 (1946) (arguing
that in determining whether a tribunal has exceeded its mandate as dictated by the compromise,
it is necessary to compare the final decision with the proscribed duties of the tribunal).
217 See ROUT, supra note 37, at 45; see also Arbitration Treaty & Award, supra note 69, para.
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W. Michael Reisman in his work, Nullity and Revision, writes that "claims
of nullity rely, either specifically or generally on assertion of exces de
pouvoir."218 The core concept is that a tribunal is only allocated the powers
that were expressly granted it in the statutory document which authorized the
tribunal or powers that are derived from the general practice of international
tribunals.2" 9 However, since not all possible scenarios that a tribunal may
encounter can be envisioned and incorporated into the arbitration treaty, an
arbitration panel must use "derivations of power perforce [which] turn on the
construction of normative statements."22 These derivations of power must be
sustainable and conform generally to the principles of customary international
law. 221
The first major case dealing with an excessive use of power by an arbitrator
was the Northeastern Frontier Dispute between Great Britain and the United
States in 183 1. The king of the Netherlands served as arbitrator, and was given
the mandate to decide between two disputed maritime borders between the
United States and Canada (then ruled by England).2 If the Dutch king did not
find either of these two lines sufficient he was authorized only to establish
further surveys in the disputed area. Instead of choosing a particular line or
ordering more surveys, the king chose a third unrelated line. 2 The United
States refused to accept this line, on the grounds of excess of power. The
award was not followed and was eventually settled in an 1842 Treaty.24
21S W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULuTY AND REVISION 246 (1971).
219 Schachter, supra note 214, at 4 n.9.
220 Id. at 247.
221 Id.
222 JACKSON RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 194
(1929). Ralston asserts that international arbitration began with the Jay Treaty between the
United States and England. Following the American-English War of 1814, neutral European
powers were looked to adjudicate boundary issues between other sovereigns on the North and
South American continents. Id. at 194. In the Northeastern Boundary Dispute case, the king
of the Netherlands was asked to determine the boundary between the United States and Great
Britain (Canada) "from the source of River St. Croix to the St. Lawrence River." Id. The Dutch
Award deviated from the given power to the tribunal, and the United States rejected it, while the
English accepted it. This issue was eventually settled in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842.
Id.; see also CARLSTON, supra note 216, at 88.
223 CARLSTON, supra note 216, at 88. Carlston argues that since the Northeastern Frontier
Dispute case was not a binding arbitration, but instead only an advisory ruling, the excess of
power argument is "academic." Id. at 89. However, the Northeastern Frontier Dispute case was
a valid arbitration with a negotiated compromis between two nations with an intended final
result. Id.
224 Id. at 88.
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Another example of excessive use of power was seen in the later case of the
Chamizal Arbitration (United States vs. Mexico, 1911).225 In Chamizal, the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 and the Gadsden Treaty of 1853 served
as the compromis to demarcate the Mexico-United States boundary along the
Rio Grande River.226 In 1884, another agreement was added to the compromis
dealing with subsequent changes caused by erosion.227 A question of title
arose when a large tract of land, named the Chamizal Tract, had been south of
the river in 1852, but with the river subsequently changed course in 1910 it
was on the north side. Failing to reach a diplomatic settlement, the boundary
commission was created to deal "solely and exclusively as to whether the
international title to the Chamizal tract is in the United States of America or
Mexico." 28
The final award divided the disputed tract between Mexico and the United
States. This was based upon a view that the 1848 and 1853 Treaties estab-
lished a fluid border between the two countries along the Rio Grande, and was
therefore not a fixed and invariable boundary. 29 As a result, the tract was
divided based upon the results of a flood that eroded the area in 1864. The
American contingent ardently attacked the award, insisting that "it clearly
departed from the terms of reference in deciding a question not submitted by
the parties."'  The compromis gave strict guidelines as to not interpret the
language of the overall boundary, but only to decide which country was to
have title to a specific Chamizal tract of land.23'
In terms of the Guyana-Venezuela boundary, the original 1897 Treaty to
Arbitrate established the mandate to decide the finality of the entire disputed
Essequibo region and demarcate a final boundary.23 2 The treaty itself
established a broad scope of potential power to the American-led tribunal, to
"ascertain all facts which they may deem necessary to a decision of the
controversy. 21 3 Because the scope of the tribunal was exceedingly broad, it
is difficult to sustain a Venezuelan claim that the Award exceeded the power




2' Chamizal Arbitration, reprinted in CARISTON, supra note 216, at 152.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 153.
231 Id.
232 Arbitration Treaty & Award, supra note 69, para. 5.
233 Id.
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that was proscribed in the compromis. Moreover, in Chamizal and the
Northeastern Frontier Dispute, the arbitrator was given only limited capacity
to decide between two delineated courses of action. When the arbitrators did
not decide based on these alternatives, they deviated from the proscribed
context. This is distinguishable from the 1899 Award because, due to the
broad scope of the 1897 compromis, virtually any decision would have been
within the scope of the compromis.
2. Corruption
The second generally accepted method for deciding an international
arbitration award is a nullity is to prove the final award was procured through
corruption or made impartiality. Oppenheim deals with corruption of a
tribunal, stating that,
[i]t is obvious that an arbitral award is only binding provided that
the arbitrators have in every way fulfilled their duties as umpires,
and have been able to arrive at their award in perfect independ-
ence. Should they have been bribed, or not have followed their
instructions, [or] should their award have been given under the
influence of coercion of any kind, or should one of the parties
have intentionally or maliciously led the arbitrators into an
essential material error, the award would have no binding
force.234
The Venezuela allegation, that the 1899 Paris Tribunal was "corrupted" and
therefore a nullity must be substantiated if it is to be legally substantiated.
Venezuela insists that a fraudulent map was offered as evidence and that the
members of the tribunal were also corrupted. 235 As Odeen Ishmael states in his
work, The Trail of Diplomacy,"
Great Britain led the arbitrators into error by submitting to them
the so-called "Physical Map" of Schomburgk of 36 square feet
without border lines, as if it were the map of 90 square feet with
234 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 27 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1952).
235 See ISHMAEL, supra note 64, ch. 4(D), para. 16.
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border lines which the explorer presented in 1844 to the Colonial
Office.236
The evidence that has been offered to date is of questionable legal value.2"
Fraud may consist of corruption or of deceit in the presentation of offered
evidence to the tribunal. In each instance, the burden of proof is on the
proponent (Venezuela) to prove that the fraud did occur, and that the result of
such fraud led to an adverse decision.23 This would entail detailing how
closely the distortion of the maps was related to the final decision of the
tribunal. As there is no ascertainable way to determine this more than one
hundred years after the final decision, it would be difficult to achieve a
positive decision on the grounds of corruption.
3. Departure from Fundamental Rules of Procedure
The earliest case that declared an arbitral award a nullity because a panel
departed from a prescribed rule of procedure came about in the 1909 Arbitral
Decision demarcating the line between Bolivia and Peru.239 The government
of Argentina, acting as the arbitrator, was instructed to demarcate the given
territory on the legal principle of uti possidetis (maintaining the former
colonial power's administrative divisions as the modem boundaries) as it
existed in 1810. If the available Spanish documents were not conclusive, the
matter was to be settled equitably.' The compromis believed equity could be
defined as "whenever the royal acts and dispositions do not define the
dominion of a territory in clear terms, the arbitrator shall decide the question
according to equity, keeping as near as possible the meaning of those
documents and to the spirit which inspired them."' 1
Bolivia refused to comply with this final judgment claiming that the
decision was not an equitable solution that deprived Bolivia of a fair share of
the territory. 242 Moreover, the doctrine of uti possidetis was not followed and
equity, which was supposedly defined as "near as possible to the documents
236 id.,
237 See ROUT, supra note 37, at 45.
238 See BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 9, at 124.
29 Schachter, supra note 214, at 4 n.9.
240 A.M. STUYT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1794-1970, 256 (1972).
241 See Treaty of La Paz, Dec. 30, 1902, Bol.-Peru, reprinted in STUYT, id. (referring to the
Bolivia-Peru boundary question to the president of Argentina for decision).
2 See Schachter, supra note 214, at 4 n.9.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
that inspired them" was abandoned. The border instead was demarcated based
upon geographical features rather than utipossidetis. The Bolivia-Peru treaty
was seen as a nullity by the Bolivian government and not followed.
The 1899 Award appears to be a diplomatic compromise between the two
disputing parties. The extent of Great Britain's claims far exceeded its actual
controlled and administered area. Venezuela's claim for the entire Essequibo
because of scattered Spanish and Gran Colombia settlements, is also difficult
to support. The 1899 Arbitration was also aware how crucial the balance of
power was in this area of South America, and how a relatively even balance
of power creates international security. The fact that Guyana was awarded
nearly all of the territory within the Schomburgk Line, and Venezuela was
given the strategic Point Barima, suggests that the tribunal made a diplomatic
compromise. 3 The scope of the 1897 compromis was not to diplomatically
compromise, but to decide neutrally the history and claims of the Essequibo.
Because of this incongruity, the Venezuelans claim that an established rule of
procedure was disregarded. They also cite the posthumous letter of Mallet-
Prevost as proof.2" Point Barima was claimed by the British as part of the
former Dutch territory; however, Venezuela considered it the main point of
control over the Essequibo and the Orinoco River, whose interior was never
disputed and remained firmly in Venezuelan control. The fact that Point
Barima was awarded to Venezuela as a gesture, is seen as an example of the
compromise.2 5
One way Venezuela could argue that the tribunal deviated from its
proscribed rule of procedure is to point out that the tribunal failed to give a
"reasoned decision" as required in the 1897 Arbitration Treaty.24 As the 1899
Arbitration did not provide legal arguments to support its decision, it may be
argued, it deviated from the rule of procedure. As Odeen Ishmael assets,
According to the prevailing opinion in the legal doctrine, the failure to give
reasons, except through an agreement to the contrary between the parties,
vitiates of nullity the verdict.24 7
Even though there is evidence that the Essequibo was awarded based upon
a diplomatic compromise, most of it is based on the Mallet-Prevost memoran-
u See BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10, at 124.
24 British Guiana-Venezuela Bounty.
245 BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10, at 125 (discussing the issue of the original Mallet-
Prevost memorandum as being untrue and citing factual inconsistencies within the memoran-
dum).
24 See ISHMAEL supra note 64, ch. 4(D) para. 17.
247 Id.
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dum. Although this may be very revealing about the intentions of the panel
members, it does not (as compared to the Bolivia-Peru example) prove that the
boundary demarcation award may be a nullity based upon departure from a
rule of procedure. Moreover, because the original 1897 treaty is so broad in
its scope and has so few aspects of applicable procedural law, it is very
difficult to substantiate a Venezuelan claim that the 1899 award is a nullity
despite its unique nature.
D. Recognition, Acquiescence, and Estoppel in International Law
Recognition and acquiescence reflect the presumed will of a State through
its actions, either expressly or implicitly.2" Section 1 will discuss and apply
the theory of recognition as seen in international law. Section 2 will define
acquiescence, and Section 3 will discuss estoppel as seen through international
legal precedent. Section 3 asserts that Venezuela may not declare that the
1899 arbitration agreement is void because of the actions Venezuela has taken
that demonstrate otherwise.
1. Recognition
The majority of scholars define recognition as a public acknowledgment by
a state of the existence of another state, law, or situation. 49 This was first seen
in the case of Eastern Greenland, where Norway accepted Danish control over
an area of Greenland by agreeing to treaties with third parties that recognized
and relied on the Danish control.' Although it does not expressly bind a state
to the action, it is nevertheless an affirmation of the presumed will of a state. 5'
Within the Venezuela-Guyana context, if Venezuela ever recognized the
validity of the 1899 Award, it cannot argue that the Award is later null and
248 id
249 See BROWNLEE, supra note 101, at 165. see also CHARLES S. RHYNE, INTERNATIONAL
LAw: THE SUBSTANCE, PROCESSES, PROCEDURES AND INSTITUTIONS FOR WORLD PEACE WrrH
JUSTICE 46 (1971).
I See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.) (1933) P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53,
at 47.
"' See SHAW, supra note 96, at 350. Brownlie defines another concept which is labeled
'express recognition.' In express recognition, the treaty of the existence of title in the other party
to a dispute (as opposed to recognition by third states) creates an effect equivalent to that of
estoppel. See BROWNUE, supra note 101, at 165; see also United Kingdom recognition of
Norwegian control over the Sverdrup Islands, 27 A.J. 92, 93 (Supp. 1933).
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void. It may be argued that the validity of the Award is already implicit in
Article Xm of the Arbitration Treaty which spells out the provisions by which
the parties would be bound to the outcome of the tribunal.252 Notwithstanding
Article XIII, Venezuela appears to have recognized the Award when it sent
commissioners to demarcate the boundary in 1905 and produced the final map
of its joint work with Great Britain.253 However, Venezuela held that it did so
unwillingly and felt compelled by the force of other nations.254 Many
historians present reasons as to why Venezuela recognized the validity of the
1899 aw7ard. As George B. Young argues, [tihe Venezuelan Chancellery
reached the conclusion that the Arbitral decision contained such vices that she
had the right to invoke its nullity. It decided not to denounce it outright as it
could not face the formidable power of its adversary without the support of the
United States.255
Nonetheless, Venezuela did recognize the 1899 Award line, when it
assigned its own boundary commissioners and ratified the work of the
boundary commission. Two press releases by the Venezuelan government
elucidate the formal policy dealing with the recognition of the 1899 Award.
In the Reclamacion de la Guyana Esequiba: Documentos 1962-1970 and
Mensajes Presidenciales y Discursos de Cancilleres: Reclamacion de la
Guyana Esequiba, the Venezuelan Government asserts that Venezuela was a
poorer and developing country when the 1899 award was established, and as
such could not have voiced dissent to the award in fear of Great Britain.256
In the colonial histories of the Guyanas, Dutch Guiana made frequent
positive statements labeling the Kutari River as the southern extension of the
Courantyne, and therefore the border. The most notable is the Tri-point
junction where the Dutch representative, Lt. Kayser, signed the Brazilian and
British junction point allowing the Kutari to be declared as the border. There
were also debates in Dutch Parliament and by the Netherlands Geographical
Society. where many Dutch officials and the geographical society stated that
252 See BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10, at 112. See THOMAS D. GRANT, THE
RECOGNITION OF STATES: LAW AND PRACrICEIN DEBATE AND EvOLUTION (1999) (providing an
extensive study of recognition in broader context).
253 See BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10, at 113.
2' The Venezuelan foreign ministry asserted that "[Venezuela] wished to delay the
demarcation of the frontier [in 1905]. In July 1900, the British minister notified the Venezuelan
government that if it did not dispatch the demarcation commission before October 3, the British
government would begin the demarcation alone." See id. at 114.
255 ROUT, supra note 37, at 44 (quoting George B. Young).
256 See id. at 45.
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they believed the Kutari to be the border, asserting that the Netherlands
recognized that British Guiana controlled the area in dispute.257
2. Acquiescence
Acquiescence, as defined in international law, occurs "in instances where
a protest is called for and does not happen."25  Brownlie asserts that
recognition, estoppel, and acquiescence have played a large role in determining
boundary awards. Brownlie makes a distinction between recognition and
acquiescence by asserting that "acquiescence has the same effect as recogni-
tion, but arises from conduct, the absence of protest when this might
reasonably be expected." '259 These are instances where the available time for
asserting a protest acknowledging a state's disagreement over a circumstance
has lapsed. If a lapse of time occurs, the state that did not object is tacitly
understood to accept the event that transpired. This instance was seen in the
Libya-Chad case where the International Court of Justice noted that "if a
serious dispute had indeed existed regarding frontiers, eleven years after the
conclusion of the 1955 Treaty, one would expect it to have been reflected in
the 1966 Treaty."2"
As applied to Guyana-Venezuela, Venezuela appears to have acquiesced to
the Award because it failed to denounce the award openly and immediately
following the ruling. 6' Some scholars indicate that Venezuela was too
destitute and poor to organize a large scale diplomatic protest. However,
Venezuela also did not object for the next fifty years, long after they were
viable enough to organize a formal protest. Moreover, the prescription clause
indicates a fifty year threshold of adverse possession. Failure to protest for
over fifty years indicates, in legal terms, acquiescence.
In terms of the Courantyne River, Guyana has acquiesced to Surinamese
control over the entire river. Guyana has allowed Point No. 61 to be
considered for the land boundary terminus in two draft treaties and did not
protest the established Dutch control over navigation rights in the Courantyne.
21 See Donovan, supra note 90, para. 45.
258 Id. Brownlie asserts that recognition, estoppel, and acquiescence are not essential to
gaining title over a disputed territory, but are of great significance to any international tribunal.
Brownlie further distinguished acquiescence from estoppel by saying that recognition is a more
persuasive element than acquiescence. BROWNLUE, supra note 101, at 645-47.
9 BROWNLIE, supra note 101, at 64547.
260 Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 21-22 (Feb. 3).
261 See BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, supra note 10, at 113.
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If Guyana were to protest the incorporation of Point No. 61 in the 1936 Mixed
Commission, it should have done so before the 1958-1962 negotiations, which
also used Point No. 61 as the land boundary terminus. The significant lapse
in time between the 1799 Agreement, granting Dutch control over the river,
and its independence could have allowed the English foreign office to raise an
objection. Yet, since there was no protest noted, modem day Guyana inherited
Britain's acquiescence to Surinamese control over the Courantyne River.
In terms of the maritime boundary, a court may hold that Suriname
acquiesced to a 330 extension to the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf because they did not object to the 19.54 British claim to the
continental shelf or to the concessions granted to Standard Oil and Shell in
1958. Subsequent drilling occurred in the same area and did not elicit a protest
from Dutch Guiana. Additionally, while Suriname has awarded offshore
drilling rights (including a 1965 permit to Shell), its concessions have more or
less gone only as far as the 330 line claimed by Guyana. Suriname has never
awarded a concession in the 'area of overlap.'
3. Estoppel
The notion of estoppel states if one party has already acquiesced or
recognized a particular situation it is prevented from arguing otherwise during
an arbitral panel. The leading relevant case on estoppel is the Temple of Preah
Vihear 62 between Cambodia and Thailand. In Preah Vihear, boundary
commissioners negotiated a final demarcation between the former colonial
government of France and Thailand. During the boundary negotiations, the
Thai prince visited a temple that was in disputed territory and saw a French
flag clearly flying over the temple. The prince did not object at that time, and
in future negotiations was prevented from raising an argument based upon his
conduct.
262 Temple of Preah Vihear, 1962 I.C.J. 6; see also D.H. Johnson, The Case Concerning the
Temple of Preah Vihear, 11 INT'L& CoM. L.Q. 1183 (1962). The dissent by Judge Spender
in Temple of Preah Vihear asserts that there must be a higher degree of acquiescence and
recognition for a party to be estopped from raising protests. Temple of Preah Vihear, supra, at
142-46. Temple ofPreah Vihear opinion on recognition in international law was later confirmed
by Queen Elizabeth II in her ruling between Argentina and Chile; see Award of Her Majesty
Queen Elizabeth II for the Arbitration of a Controversy between the Argentine Republic and the
Republic of Chile (1966); Argentina-Chile Frontier Case, 16 R.I.A.A. 109 (1969); see also R.Y.
Jennings, The Argentine-Chile Boundary Dispute: A Case Study, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
THE LEGAL ASPECrS 315 (Francis Vallit ed., 1972).
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In the same way, Venezuela's actions of recognizing the 1899 Award by
dispatching boundary commissioners to demarcate the boundary demonstrate
the willingness to accept the Award. As a result, it may be estopped from
asserting the nullity of the 1899 Award in front of any tribunal. Moreover,
because Venezuela did not object immediately after the Paris arbitration, it is
further estopped from claiming that it did not rely on the ruling of the tribunal.
In sum, any tribunal which might hear the Suriname-Guyana case, could
prevent Guyana from raising claims to the Courantyne due to an acquiescence
principle. It also could prevent Suriname from claiming the New River
Triangle on a recognition concept, or the continental shelf on acquiescence.
E. Prescription
The elements of occupation (animus domini and animus corpus) permitted
a state to acquire territory only when no other state had perfected title to it.
When the land was under the power of one state, international law provides
other means for acquiring title to the disputed land. One such mechanism
relevant to the New River Triangle dispute is by gaining title through
prescription. Prescription is analogous to the common law property term
"adverse possession" and generally requires the same conditions. The adverse
possession has to be open, conspicuous, notorious, and uninterrupted for a
"reasonable period of time."' This possession must not be contested or
challenged by the original possessor.2
Prescription is defined as "legitimisation of a doubtful title by the passage
of time and the presumed acquiescence of the former sovereign.."26  The
doctrine of prescription was dealt with most recently in Case Concerning
Kasikili/Sedudu Island.' s In prescription, if the state which initially
maintained control of an area that was adversely possessed did not maintain
Prescription is dealt with in three major international awards. Clipperton Island
Arbitration (Fr. v. Mex.), 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390(1932); Western Sahara Case, 12 I.C.J. 43,43,
para. 92; Minquier and Ecrehos Case, 1953 I.C.J. 47.
26 The reasonable amount of time and the objection of the state are considered in two major
awards. See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.) (1933) P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53,
at 45-46; Western Sahara Case, 12 I.C.J. 42-43, para. 92. The type of encroachment needed to
manifest sovereignty is analogous to the terra nullius requirements ofanimus domini and corpus.
See Minquier and Ecrehos Case, 1953 I.C.J. 47; and Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v.
Nor.) 1951 I.C.J. 116, 184.
25 See SHAw, supra note 96, at 343-44.
26 Press Release, I.C.J., The Court Finds that Kasikili/Sedudu Island Forms part of the
Territory of Botswana (Dec. 13, 1999) (on file with author).
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actual control over the area, most legal analysts suggest that this land was not
the territory of the original sovereign but rather terra nullius. To gain title by
prescription, the intruding elements need to be part of a nation-state. Jurists
have also described prescription as de facto possession of a territory. Under
this theory, if possession was known to be illegitimate from the beginning, but
if established and maintained for a "considerable number of years," it creates
good title to the occupied land.267 For example, in the Botswana-Namibia
dispute, title cannot be perfected by non-state actors (private citizens)
encroaching upon sovereign territory. In both instances of prescription and
terra nullius, the outcome is similar. The state constructively occupying the
territory maintains sovereignty.
The requirement for a 'reasonable amount of time' is imprecise and has
gained little judicial review. 6 Determining a proper time frame will depend
on the circumstances involved in deciding the title to the area, competing
claims, and the nature of the dispute. One international case that considered
prescription was the Minquier and Ecrehos 69 In Minquier, France and
England were disputing a group of Islets in the English Channel where titles
could be traced back before 1066. The court did not concentrate on the
historic titles offered, but instead concentrated on the recent acts of prescrip-
tion that occurred throughout the last century. °
Under a prescription theory, Suriname or Guyana could argue that although
one side effectively demonstrated animus corpus and animus domini
throughout the colonial era, the fact that each entity ignored a conspicuous
encroachment onto the disputed territory would preclude title. Each side
would cite prescription as encroachment by elements of their military, because
encroachment needs to be performed by a state organ. A prescription
argument would be especially beneficial for Suriname, which otherwise lacks
objective manifestations of intent and control of the New River Triangle.
Through a prescription argument, Suriname could effectively gain title to the
New River Triangle simultaneously with Guyana demonstrating intent to
occupy the land. The issue would center on whether Guyana objected to
Suriname's encroachment.
267 See FIORE, supra note 90, at 428.
268 Id. at 345.
26 See Minquier and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.) 1953 I.C.J. 47.
270 Id.
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F. Relevant Law as to Maritime Delineation
The maritime dispute between Guyana and Suriname has received the most
attention since Guyana's invocation of Annex VII dispute resolution under the
United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea in February 2004.271 The
maritime areas are also potentially the most lucrative, with ascertainable
amounts of commercially extractable petroleum on the continental shelf. This
section will discuss the three legal issues apparent in the maritime dispute
between Suriname and Guyana. Part IV.F.I details the use of equity or
equidistance in delineating the outlying maritime areas. Part IV.F.2 discusses
the legal precedent by which tribunals refuse to grant outlying maritime areas
that were not recognized at the time of treaty, and Part IV.F.3 discusses
demarcating a boundary river between two adjacent states.
1. Equidistance or Equity?
The delineation of outlying maritime zones is an increasingly evolving area
of the law. In the early stages of its development, maritime law was dependent
upon choosing a land boundary terminus and extending the land boundary
terminus in a mutually agreed direction. 2 This "equidistance" point dividing
the area equally between two separate countries came under attack for its strict
application of delineation, when the use of the maritime area might indicate
otherwise. 73 For the greater extent of the twentieth century, the equity
271 Thomas W. Donovan, Guyana Invokes Annex VII of United Nations Convention on Law
of the Sea Against SurinameforDispute Maritime Boundary, AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. INSIGHTS, Apr.
2004, at http://www.asil.org/insights/insighl31.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
272 Both Suriname and Guyana are parties to the Law of the Sea Conventions. Therefore, they
have committed themselves to a settlement dispute system that is dictated by the treaty. This is
expressly stated in Article 188 of the treaty whereby both parties must submit "to a special
Chamber of the Law of the Sea Tribunal, an ad hoc Chamber of Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber, or
to binding arbitration." United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21
I.L.M. 1245, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.un.orgILOS. The Territorial Sea is the
twelve mile extension immediately adjacent to the land territory of a state. Within this twelve
mile extension, a country "may consider part of the territory of the state, and it is generally
recognized that a state can exercise the same sovereignty over these waters as over its land area."
See BARRY E. CARTER & PH.LiP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 989 (2d ed. 1995).
Jurisdiction under the Law of the Sea extends to the sea bed and continental shelf areas.
See also A.O. ADEDE, THE SYSTEM FOR SET rLEMENT OF DISPUTES UNDER THE CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA 270 (1987). Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahirya v. Malta), 1982
I.C.J. 18, 23 (citing Special Agreement Between Tunisia and Libya).
273 David A. Colson, The Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf Between Neighboring
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principle was used. Equity refers to the use by a particular sovereign of the
outlying maritime areas, and how this use demonstrates possession. For
example, if a country has historically used a strait for navigation or traditional
fishing regimes, it would be deprived of its access through the exercise of
judicial decision. However, jurists and legal analysts have recently argued that
maritime delineation has returned to an equidistance principle, although with
exceptions. That is, a respected international tribunal will look first to
ascertain whether an equidistance line is possible. The tribunal will consider
the relationship of the maritime zone to the land mass, and then see if any
equitable reasons prohibits its use.274 As Judge Guillaume states: "Such a
result may be achieved by first identifying the equidistance line, then
correcting that line to take into account special circumstances or relevant
factors, which are both essentially geographical in nature." '275
The applicable law for dealing with a continental shelf or outlying marine
areas is Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention. The convention is
concerned with cases where the same continental shelf extends between two
adjacent states.276 The convention asserts that the boundary between two
adjacent states shall be determined by agreement; however, in the absence of
any agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special
circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by a median line based upon
the principle of equidistance. This principle has been applied in many
international boundary delineations.277 However, in 1969 in the North Sea
States, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 91, 91 (2003).
274 Id. at 91.
25 Judge Gilbert Guillaume, Speech to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the
United Nations (Oct. 31,2001), available athttp://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/ipresscom/speeches/
ispeechPresidentGuillaume_6thCommittee_21501.htm. The International Court of Justice has
at its disposal the resources and cartographic capabilities to adjust the line sufficient for modem
standards of mapping. See NAGENDRA SINGH, THE RoLE AND RECORD OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE 417 (1989).
276 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20), at 27-28 (defining
'adjacent'). The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases were between the Federal Republic of
Germany and Denmark, and the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands. See also W.
Michael Reisman & Bernard Oxman, International Decision, Maritime Delimitation between
Opposite States-Traditional Artisanal Fishing Regimes-Transboundary Nonliving
Resources-Interpretation of Prior Award-Straight Baselines-Effect of Coastal and Midsea
Islands, Eritren-Yemen Arbitration (Award, Phase II: Maritime Delimitation), 94 AM. J. INT'L
L. 721, 734 (2000).
1 Italy-Yugoslavia, 7 l.L.M. 547 (1968); USSR-Finland, 7 I.L.M. 727 (1965); Iran-Saudi
Arabia; UK-Denmark 1967 3278, U.K.-Netherlands, 1967, USSR-Poland, 1969.
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Continental Shelf Cases,"' the International Court of Justice decided that
Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention was not binding on the parties.279
The Third Law of the Sea Conference did not establish a precise legislative
standard for delineating the continental shelf. In this absence, the delineation
of the sea floor has been taken on by international judicial responsibility.
Therefore, since delineation based upon equidistance was not an applicable
measure, it was necessary to decide the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
based upon principles of equity. Economic concessions and usage of the
continental shelf were examples of equitable principles that create a dividing
line between adjacent states on the continental shelf.
The equity principle is relevant to the Suriname-Guyana maritime dispute
because since 1958, Guyana has been active in the outlying economic zone and
has awarded concessions in the 'triangle of overlap.' Suriname never objected
to these concessions nor did they object to the movement enjoyed by Guyana
fishermen and support personnel to the oil expeditions. This defacto line, if
it is to be considered as one, would be deemed relevant to determine the
equitable result of the outlying maritime areas.
Since the borders of the outlying areas were never formalized during
colonial rule, if any state had a claim to the outlying area or activity on the
area, it would have been inherited by the successor states under the doctrine
of uti possidetis juris. The continental shelf was claimed by British Guyana
in 1954,2"0 and consequential concessions were granted. These concessions,
along with modern concessions to Maxus, Exxon, and CGX add up to an
equitable maritime delineation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic
zone. While Guyana maintained these outlying claims, Suriname asserted
claims for the territorial sea based upon having sovereignty over the
Courantyne River and a 10" extension from Point No. 61.1' No contiguous
zone was claimed outside the three mile limit envisaged by the 1936 Mixed
278 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
1 Id. The International Court of Justice has confirmed this holding in later cases. The
ability to decide outlying maritime areas upon principles of equity can be seen in Maritime
Delineation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38;
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Main Area (Can. v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 246
(Oct. 12); The Continental Shelf Case (Libyan Arab Jamhariya v. Malta), 1984 I.C.J. 1.
2W Alteration of Boundaries, Order in Council of 1954, Statutory Instruments, No. 1372,
Colonies, Protectorates, and Trust Territories, U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.B/6, 48, in
HERTONSSON, supra note 80, at 165.
281 ld. at64.
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Commission. 2 Therefore, Guyana has a strong claim that it should be
awarded title to the outlying areas because of activity in these areas.
2. Contemporary Conceptions of Maritime Areas Relevant to Demarcation
Although Guyana's plausible claim to the outlying exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf are strong, this claim does not include the
immediate territorial sea. A territorial sea is the exclusive maritime jurisdic-
tion of a state immediately bordering the land mass. The 1936 Mixed
Commission offered the 100 extension to delineate the territorial sea which
both states agreed to in practice. Even though they did not ratify this
agreement, their consent and acquiescence has created a defacto boundary in
the territorial sea. Extending only three miles from the coast in 1936, modem
territorial seas are proscribed at twelve nautical miles. In delineating the
Guyana-Suriname issue, it is probable that due to the precedent and acquies-
cence caused by the 1936 Mixed Commission any tribunal will likely delineate
the territorial sea and outlying maritime zones based upon different precedents.
International tribunals have consistently not awarded outlying maritime
areas that were not conceived of during the time of treaty. In the 1952 case of
In the Matter of an Arbitration Between Petroleum Development (Trucial
Coast) Ltd. the court was asked whether the territorial sea extension should be
applied to the outlying maritime areas. The court held that "continental shelf
had no accepted meaning either at the time of the drafting of the contract in
1939 nor at the time of the rendering of the award." '283 Therefore, an outlying
maritime area must be decided based upon contemporary applicable interna-
tional precedent or through treaty between the bordering states.
In the Suriname-Guyana dispute, the Suriname's claim of 100 extension
throughout the territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone,
is difficult to substantiate because these outlying areas did not exist at the time
of ratification. After the 1936 Mixed Commission, Guyana claimed the
continental shelf, and parceled concessions to interested companies. This
intent and occupation, substantiated by international legal precedent, indicates
282 See WTIL1UAM E. MASTERSON, JURISDICTION IN MARGINAL SEAS 387 (1929) (explaining
that the Netherlands government, however, stated that it considers "the regulation of the question
of territorial waters... impossible or difficult, because of the divergent views... of the various
States").
283 In the matter of an Arbitration between Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. and
the Sheikh ofAbu Dhabi, 1 INT'L& COMP. L.Q. 247 (1952).
[Vol. 32:661
20041 CHALLENGES TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF GUYANA
ajustifiable argument for Guyana that the territorial sea and outlying maritime
areas should be demarcated upon different principles.
3. River Demarcation and the Thalweg Principle
The Suriname-Guyana dispute over the maritime zone is complicated by the
fact that the two states are divided by a boundary river, which is also in
dispute. However, the impact of the precise land boundary terminus is only
relevant to the immediate territorial sea, because the outlying exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf do not have to be demarcated using a
straight line extension from a land boundary terminus. The offshore dispute
is also simplified by the fact there are no disputed offshore islands, which
could affect a line of demarcation.
Normally, the land boundary terminus would have been placed in the
midpoint, thalweg, of the Courantyne River if no other special arrangements
had existed. The 1799 Agreement, in an unusual and atypical case, located the
land boundary terminus at the west bank (Guyana side) of the Courantyne
River. Determining a boundary at a river bank, instead of a river thalweg is
not without international precedent. 2 4 The Shatt al-Arab is an example where
a river bank is used to determine the border between Iraq and Iran. In the Shatt
al-Arab, the Ottoman Empire, and its successor state, Iraq, exercised
jurisdiction over the entire river, despite Iranian protests. 25 A river bank
boundary is therefore a special circumstance, which although valid, is
uncommon. Article 15 of the Law of the Sea" 6 allows for unconventional
demarcation in maritime areas, stating that
[w]here the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each
other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement
between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond
the median line every point of which is equidistant .... The
above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary
by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to
28 See JONES, supra note 95, at 118.
285 Id. at 119.
286 Suriname and Guyana are both signatories to the convention, at http://www.un.org/Deptsl
Ios/convention-agreements/convention-overview-convention.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
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delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at
variance therewith.2 7
The exception of 'historic title' applies to the 1799 Agreement which has
existed as the boundary for over two hundred years. The issue therefore
becomes how the 1799 Agreement affects the immediate twelve mile territorial
sea.2"' If Point No. 61 is to be assumed as the land boundary terminus, then
any offshore delineation towards the original 100 can be asserted by Suriname
relying on the precedent in the 1936 Mixed Commission and 1958-1962
negotiations. Because Guyana has acquiesced to this terminus in practice, it
appears as though Guyana has consented to Point No. 61 as the land boundary
terminus and has recognized Suriname' s complete control over the Courantyne
River.2"9
V. CONCLUSION
The findings of this Article strongly suggest that Guyana should continue
to advocate for international arbitration of its disputes in a respected forum.
The elements of constructive occupation, fundamental realities of governance
in the disputed territories, and colonial histories indicate that if Guyana would
submit all of its territorial disputes with Venezuela and Suriname to a tribunal
it may likely gain undisputed title to the New River Triangle and the
Essequibo. Even though Suriname's claim to the entire Courantyne River and
islands contained therein would probably be reaffirmed, the record and
297 Law of the Sea Convention, art. 15; Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia
Concerning Portions of the Limits of Their Offshore Areas As Defined in the Canada-Nova
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act and the Canada Newfound-
land Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, at http://www.boundary-dispute.ca/ (last visited Jan.
28, 2004).
288 Coastal states are entitled to claim, absent any bilateral or multilateral treaties obliging
otherwise, a twelve mile territorial sea that is the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal state. The
outlying zone of the exclusive economic zone and the Continental shelf are not the territorial
extension of the sovereign coastal state, but may be used solely by the state for economic
purposes such as fishing or extrapolation of resources. See BROWNUE, supra note 101, at 228.
289 Express consent is seen in the British Guiana v. Venezuela Boundary Arbitration, 92
BRr. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 160. British Guiana v. Venezuela is the most relevant case to the
Guyana-Suriname instance. The notion of implied consent and the court's reliance of this
principle has also been seen in Chamizal. Case Concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier
Land (Belgium v. Netherlands) 1959 I.C.J. 209, 227, and Land, Island and Maritime Frontier
Dispute Case (El Sal. v Hond.) 1992 I.C.J. 351, 401.
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available international jurisprudence clearly suggest that Guyana would be
granted a beneficial outlying continental shelf and exclusive economic zone.
Because of its small size compared to its neighbor Venezuela, Guyana has
chartered a course of foreign policy that emphasizes international law and
peaceful arbitration of international disputes. This is a stark contrast from its
early colonial history of conquest. Although it has defended "incursions" into
its claimed territory through military force, it has done so reluctantly. In the
modern world, Guyana is very adept at emphasizing its point through the
internet and publications. Its Ministry of Foreign Affairs is proficient in
producing scholarly literature and making available documents from the
colonial to the present eras that support its claim for the disputed territories.
A nation's territorial integrity is a fundamental priority and in no other
nation is it as poignant as Guyana. The disputed section of Guyana comprises
nearly sixty percent of the small nation's territory and a large segment of its
population. It is a major issue in the daily periodicals and galvanizes the
polity. In the early years, Guyana's foreign policy was to conclude diplomatic
agreements with the regional powerhouses of Cuba and Brazil, attempting to
align itself with nations large enough to protect it from its contentious
neighbors. A balance of power through diplomacy has now created the
platform enabling all these nations to address their grievances through
international law. Today, Guyana should proceed more assertively to advocate
international adjudication of its claims.
The strongest overall argument for Guyana is the fact that Venezuela has
concurred in the use of the Schomburgk line as its defacto border with Guyana
and relied on the present border for over one hundred years. Although
possibly procured through a process that could qualify it as a nullity, the 1897
Arbitration Agreement says itself that fifty years of continuous conduct shall
create good title. This clause in the compromise was never objected to by
Venezuela, and therefore creates acquiescence between the two parties.
Because Venezuela has demarcated the area, it is a clear example of recogni-
tion, and of a de facto line which has been relied on by the international
community. Few maps label the area between Venezuela and Guyana as
disputed, and the ones that do also represent the present day border, re-
affirming the current Guyana line.
This Article has suggested that, when there is a balance of power between
competing nations, countries may submit themselves to a respected interna-
tional tribunal for arbitration. In the developing world, until this balance of
power is created, nations will continue to be governed by survival and national
interest' politics. Assuaging boundary disputes with threats toward armed
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conflict only creates hemorrhages in the international community, fueling
further instability in an area which needs to adhere to fundamental rules of
international law and developmental progression. Developing nations must
become more inter-connected, not further apart through armed conflict.
Guyana is one such country; it understands this Concept and has thus structured
its foreign policy around the development of international law, treaties, and the
inter-connection between other developing countries in the Caribbean.
